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Current History

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March, 1958

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As Keith Irvine points out in his introductory article, ". . . it is evident that a nationalistic earthquake, similar to that which has so rudely shaken the colonial structure in Asia, is imminent in Africa." The resulting crisis is already taxing the wisdom, patience and ability of the French as well as the Africans striving for new status. In this issue 6 authors evaluate the problems involved for France and the African states.

French Rule in Africa

BY KEITH IRVINE

Editor of *Africa Weekly*

"**F**RENCH, Ma'am. A language for the meagre-hearted. If God ever made a worse colonist than the French He hasn't let me know about it. It takes more than a little straw hat and a cigarette and a thimbleful of absinthe all set out in a neat little office to open out Africa. . . ."

So spoke Trader Horn. But then Trader Horn, we must remember, was a Briton. He was, moreover, doubly prejudiced. Had not the French forced him out of the Ogowe River—his adopted home and his livelihood—on the grounds that the Royal Niger Company was barring the Niger to all but British traders?

The history of the growth of colonialism throughout the world can, in part, be understood in terms of the ancient rivalry between France and Britain. The one a land power, the other a sea power, each sought—in the face of a stalemate in Europe—to outmaneuver its adversary in another continent. Seapower carried the day for the British in America and Asia. Africa, therefore, represented the last chance for France, the third and final act in the long-drawn-out drama.

It is, consequently, hardly surprising that English writings relating to the French in Africa should prove to be conditioned by these circumstances. This conditioning is

even observable in the literary prose of a writer like Conrad, who, in his "Heart of Darkness," has conveyed an almost poetic image of a man-of-war anchored off the West African coast ("The French had one of their wars going on thereabouts") engaged in shelling the bush. "Pop, would go one of the six-inch guns; a small flame would dart and vanish, a little white smoke would disappear, a tiny projectile would give a feeble screech—and nothing happened. Nothing could happen. . . . In the empty immensity of earth, sky, and water, there she was, incomprehensible, firing into a continent."

The effects of this conditioning appear, in part, to have exercised a formative influence upon the American view of Africa. While the informed American public is, at the present time, rapidly assimilating the essential facts concerning British-administered Africa, there is a strong tendency, both linguistically and psychologically, to neglect, to reject, or to ignore French Africa. At a time, however, when it is becoming increasingly impossible to see Africa steadily without seeing it whole, it is obviously desirable that the essential facts concerning the French-administered territories should be at least equally well known.

The story of France in Africa can be

conveniently divided into three periods: first, the period of the trading settlements (1362-1817); second, the period of colonial expansion (1818-1898); third, the modern period—which might be described as a period of occupation and industrialization.

The Trading Settlements (1362-1817)

In effect, the French appear to have been the first European nation to establish a foothold in West Africa—despite the fact that the British, for political reasons, have tended to permit credit to go instead to their oldest allies, the Portuguese, who sent ships there in the fifteenth century. The Arab historian El Bekri has recorded that between the years 844 and 860 A.D. the Normans—whom he called the “Madjous”—were arriving on the African coast. In the fourteenth century, Norman-French ships, sailing out of Dieppe (called to this day the “Town of Ivory”) began to trade for ivory with West Africa. An ivory-carving industry was established in Dieppe in 1364. In this very year two ships under the command of “Jehan Li Roanois” reached the Liberian coast, and then went on to the Gold Coast. In 1365 they returned once more, and built earthen huts for trading.

In this way the French established a chain of stations along the Guinea Coast—one at the mouth of the Senegal River, two more on the Liberian coast, called “Petit-Paris” and “Petit-Dieppe,” as well as other stations at Kormantin and Accra, and, in 1380, a fort at Elmina (“La Mine”). However, by 1410 France was in such serious straits because of the catastrophes—ranging from the Black Death to the Hundred Years War—which had struck her in the fourteenth century, that the Dieppoises were forced to abandon their Guinea trade, ivory or no, and the little forts were left to moulder.

Although African bibliographies record the publication in 1559 of “*Les Voyages Adventureux du Capitaine Jean Alfonse Saint-ongeois*,” it was not until the seventeenth century that the French returned once more to stay, founding a colony at the mouth of the Senegal River. Nearby, they are said to have discovered the remains of a Norman fort, built three centuries earlier by the

Dieppoises, and to have founded there the city of St. Louis. (St. Louis remained the capital of Senegal down to 1957, when the administration was transferred to Dakar.)

A record of this period exists in the writings of Claude Jannequin de Rochefort, who left Dieppe for Senegal in 1637 as clerk to the captain of a ship—later, with others, exploring the Senegal River for 110 miles in a small wooden boat. The French, however, were not the only colonists at this time, and in the decades that followed, most of the wars of Europe found their reflection in West Africa.

In 1677, France captured four ports on the Senegalese coast from the Dutch, including one on the island of Goree, which commanded the entrance to Dakar. French power in Senegal was then consolidated following the arrival in 1697 of a remarkable man named André de Brue, who was at once trader and scientist. Establishing himself at St. Louis, he explored the surrounding territories, and, in his capacity as an official of the Royal Senegal Company, sent agents up into the dangerous and previously inaccessible gold-bearing country of Bambuk—a mountainous region which, in the later Middle Ages, had provided the Emperors of Mali with much of their wealth.

In the Anglo-French wars of the eighteenth century, all the French posts in Senegal were captured although, in what later proved a major strategic error on their part, the British returned Goree to the French under the terms of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the French were once more expanding their influence by exploring the hinterland. French colonization was striking root in Africa. In 1817, at the end of the final Napoleonic War, Britain, feeling at last secure, returned to her ancient rival all her Senegalese settlements. France has kept them to this day.

Colonial Expansion (1818-1898)

The nineteenth century was a time in which the relationship between Europe and Africa was transformed from one of trade to one of conquest and occupation. European interest in Africa was, apart from the slave trade, of small account at the out-

set of the century. However, by the 1880's, the European powers had entered into a period of frantic competition to acquire territory—far more territory, in fact, than they could hope, to administer with any marked degree of success.

The competition, however, was not primarily for immediate commercial advantage, but rather for strategic position. The French settlements in Senegal had not proved very profitable, and there were periods—for example in the 1860's—when the British government was under strong pressure at home to abandon all its West African possessions, with the possible exception of Sierra Leone.

The nineteenth century was, of course, the heyday of British supremacy. The other European powers, however, desiring to outmaneuver Britain, began gradually to increase their interest in Africa. While initially contact was made through the medium of missionaries, adventurers, eccentrics and others who held their lives cheap, by the end of the century each of the major powers in Europe had been engaged in a conscious and organized attempt to establish its paramountcy in Africa. Strategically, each sought to do this by attempting to occupy a belt of territory which would cut Africa in half, thereby obtaining a dominant position on the continent which lay athwart Britain's commercial lifeline to India.

Portugal—weak and ineffectual—could, by joining Angola to Mozambique, hope to achieve little but to cut South Africa off from the rest of the continent. Germany hoped to establish a giant state called *Mittelafrika*, stretching from Tanganyika to the Cameroons. Italy strove to thrust downwards from Libya through the Sudan and Ethiopia to Italian Somaliland. Britain attempted to establish a zone of influence stretching from South Africa up through the Rhodesias to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and British-dominated Egypt. (Tanganyika, mandated to Britain by the League of Nations at the end of the First World War, provided the missing link in the chain.)

France, meanwhile, sought from Senegal to drive through the continent from end to end in order to link up with the tiny colony of French Somaliland on the Red Sea.

Colonel J. B. Marchand actually travelled along this route in his famous march in 1898. He was, however, checkmated at Fashoda, where for a few crucial days the political future of the African continent, as well as the peace of Europe, hung in the balance as Whitehall and the Quai d'Orsay collided. Finally Marchand, who had only 200 men against Kitchener's 20,000, was "recalled," although in effect he continued his transcontinental march in an unofficial capacity. The major aim of French policy in Africa had been thwarted, and the chance was never to return.

With this strategic background in mind, we may now proceed to examine the history of French expansion in Africa.

In all, France secured four main footholds on the African continent. The first foothold that she gained was at the mouth of the Senegal River. The second, toward the end of the eighteenth century, was obtained when, in order to prevent the Portuguese from re-occupying the African kingdom of Kongo, French missionaries were sent there in the place of Italians. As a result of this, King Denis of Gabon, who headed the Mpongwe tribe, became pro-French, and in 1839, during the reign of Louis-Phillippe, placed his country under French protection—the French consolidating their advantage by occupation in 1844.

The third foothold was won when in June, 1830, a French army landed on the Algerian coast at Sidi Ferruche. The fourth foothold was established when a French expeditionary force, after failing in an attempt to outflank Aden by annexing the island of Penim (the British forestalling them), turned instead to the Eritrean coast where, pushing southwards, they established the colony of French Somaliland.

Senegal, however, remained the seed, as it were, from which France's African empire later sprang.¹ The major part of French expansion South of the Sahara took the form of a thrust from Senegal to the upper reaches

¹ In view of its long tradition of association with France, Senegal, down to this day, has preserved a special status. At the time of the French Revolution, by the Decree of 16 Pluviose (1792), which abolished slavery, it was stated that "all men without distinction of color domiciled in French colonies are French citizens." As a result, the original four Communes of Senegal, Rufisque, Dakar and Goree survived as "equalitarian islands in an authoritarian sea." (T. L. Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*.)

of the Niger, and thence due east along the Sudanese savannah.

An early pioneer in this direction was the remarkable explorer René Caillie, who managed not only to penetrate to Timbuktu—a feat he achieved in 1828—but also, unlike his predecessor, Major Gordon Laing, to return alive. His example was not soon followed in view of the fact that the path was barred by the rise of a great Fula leader, Al Hadji Omar, who became so powerful that he threatened even the security of the Senegal settlements. However, in 1854, the situation was transformed by the arrival in Senegal of a new Governor-General, Faïdherbe, a man of great ability who was sent abroad by reason of his political unpopularity with the administration of Napoleon III.

Later called the "Napoleon of the Colonies," Faïdherbe, in the space of a few years, succeeded in laying the foundations of what later became French West Africa. His first step, upon arrival, was to attack the Moorish tribes to the north, thus freeing the Woloff from Moorish control, and placing them under French rule instead. He then annexed the Wuli country, and built a fort at Medina in order to resist Al Hadji Omar. Omar, himself a remarkable man, who was engaged in welding the Muslim kingdoms of the Niger into a single empire, attacked Fort Medina in the dry season of 1857, knowing that the river level was too low for Faïdherbe to come to its relief. Fortunately for the French the fort held out for a hundred days, after which the rains came, the river bed filled up, and Faïdherbe was able to get through by boat to relieve Medina. In the campaigns that preceded and followed the relief of Medina, Faïdherbe occupied the country between St. Louis and the mouth of the Gambia, as well as both banks of the Casamance River, and then, in the 1860's, the country between Portuguese Guinea and Sierra Leone.

Meanwhile, Omar, after further struggles with the French, was finally killed in 1864 while attempting to suppress a Fulani revolt. Faïdherbe left Senegal in the following year—1865. He had achieved much for France. Apart from his conquests he had also sent emissaries to the plateau of Futa

Djallon, and even as far east as Segu on the Niger. Nor were all his activities military. It was Faïdherbe himself who was primarily responsible for introducing the groundnut to Senegal—today one of its staple products.

The 15 years that followed were years of stagnation. In France, the Second Empire had entered into its final period of decadence that was to culminate in the defeat at Sedan. The subsequent ten years were years of rehabilitation. By the 1880's, however, France was prepared to enter a period of colonial expansion.

By this time fresh players had appeared upon the scene to assume the roles vacated by Omar and by Faïdherbe. These were the nephew of Omar, named Ahmadu, and a French captain, skilled in railway construction, named Gallieni. Gallieni—later to become the mentor of Lyautey—surveyed the route between the Senegal and Niger rivers, ready for the railway that was completed in 1888. He also founded and fortified the modern town of Bamako on the Niger.

Meanwhile Ahmadu was proving a thorn in the side of the French, although not so painful a thorn as his uncle had been. More inclined to rely on diplomacy than force, Ahmadu attempted to gain British support, but, failing in this, signed a treaty with the French in 1887, placing his country under French protection. By 1890, however, the French were at war with Ahmadu and his Takkur ("Toucouleur") Fulas. The French advance eventually drove Ahmadu to take refuge in Hausaland, where he died in 1898.

In the meantime, another African leader had arisen who was to give more trouble to the French than any other in the nineteenth century—Samory. A Mandingo of humble origin, who had risen to power through his ability and courage, he operated from his home country of Bissandugu, near the Liberian frontier. The French soldier Archinard (who had finally opened the way to Timbuktu in his campaign against Ahmadu, later occupying the city itself in 1894), defeated Samory and conquered his home country in 1891.

But Samory's career was far from over. For another eight years he played hide

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REVISIONIST BOOKS

Dealing with The Two World Wars and Their Aftermath

With Brief Comments

"With the publication in 1948 of his [Charles A. Beard's] *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War*, revisionism reached the status of a mature historical interpretation of events that no serious student of prewar policy could ignore."

Dr. Louis Morton (Chief of the Pacific Section of the United States Army Office of Military History), in "Pearl Harbor in Perspective: A Bibliographical Survey," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (April, 1955), pp. 461-465.

Although this is a modest list of books limited to the outstanding volumes on the subject which have been published in English, it will prove an "eye-opener" to most teachers and students of history.

Few of the important revisionist books dealing with the causes, merits and results of the second World War have been reviewed in historical journals or the book review sections of leading newspapers and periodicals. When they have been reviewed, their nature and contents have rarely been fairly stated and appraised.

It has almost universally been taken for granted that, however important revisionist research and publication may have been in setting the record straight in regard to the first World War, there is no revisionist issue or problem relative to the second World War.

The facts already well established demonstrate, however, that the revisionist correction of wartime illusions and prejudices relative to the second World War is far more drastic and revolutionary than the import of the revisionist publications which appeared between 1920 and 1935. The works cited in this Bibliography will enable historians who seek the truth to undertake this novel and exciting intellectual adventure in a realistic and informed manner.

The majority of the books listed in this Bibliography deal with the second World War. In the light of the fact that there has been a recent effort on the part of some writers and publishers to discredit the revisionism of 1920-1935 and return to the myths and propaganda of 1914-1919, the Bibliography leads off with an ample selection of the chief books which, in an earlier generation, set forth the assured facts on the events that followed June, 1914.

30 pages. Single copies, 50 cents; 25-100 copies, 25 cents each; 100 or more copies 15 cents each.

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and seek with the French, ranging far and wide through West Africa from Liberia in the west to the borders of Ashanti and Dahomey in the east. His name became an international byword, and his activities prevented the French from establishing their power effectively. He was finally taken prisoner one day in 1898—as much to the surprise of the French as of himself—and exiled to the Congo.

From 1890 onwards, the colonial rule not only of the French but also of the other European powers expanded at an extraordinarily rapid rate. As a result resistance to further advance came increasingly from other European powers, rather than from African rulers. By this time the French had established themselves in Tunisia no less than in Algeria. They were, however, uneasy lest some other European power should seek to intersperse itself between the French North African and the French West African empires. Their anxiety was relieved in 1890, when the British conceded the area in question to be a French zone of influence.

With this diplomatic point established, the French then proceeded to forestall their rivals wherever they could. Between 1888 and 1890, Captain Louis Binger had marched down from Senegal in a gigantic arc, making treaties as he went, limiting the further expansion inland of Portuguese Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, and finally emerging on the Ivory Coast where the French had had trading forts since 1843. The French also had trading interests on the Slave Coast, and soon made claims to sovereignty over Cotonou and Porto Novo that were contested by the Kings of Dahomey—first Gelele, and then, in the 1890's, Behanzin.

In 1893, they marched inland against Behanzin, and, defeating his army of 25,000 (including its famous regiment of Amazons) at the battle of Poguessa, occupied his capital city of Abomey, and sent him into exile. By 1896, the French had advanced still further inland from Dahomey—in search of the ubiquitous Samory, who had suddenly appeared in those parts—and thereby succeeded in linking up their Dahomeyan possession with their rapidly growing West African empire via the Upper Volta regions.

In so doing they won the further advantage of cutting off the British Gold Coast and German Togoland to the North.

There followed a period of extreme tension, however, when, between 1896 and 1898, the French not only began to cut off the Northern expansion of Nigeria, but also began to reach down the Niger in an attempt to reach navigable waters. Although technically they had agreed not to cross the famous Say-Barrawa line—which runs approximately along what is today the northern frontier of Nigeria—in practice they circumvented this agreement by going round the line, and then moving south in the region of Bornu.

Against this frankly expansionist technique, the British Colonial Secretary, Sir Joseph Chamberlain, played what he called his “chessboard” policy. Wherever a French force appeared, the British sent small token platoons into the adjoining villages. Within a short time tension grew acute, as French and British troops became scattered behind each other's lines like pieces on a chessboard. It needed but one incident to start a major colonial war, if not a European one. On the very brink of war, however, an agreement was negotiated—the Niger Convention of 1898, whereby the limits of French and British rule in West Africa were definitively fixed and bounded. The Niger crisis was quickly followed by the even more important encounter at Fashoda, where Marchand's confrontation with Kitchener, and its diplomatic consequences, settled in essence the outstanding question of who was to win the final round in the long-drawn-out game of strategic trans-African noughts and crosses. The occupation of Africa was a *fait accompli*.

A *fait accompli*, that is, in the diplomatic sense. For a further and equally dramatic *envoi* was to be added to this long chapter of colonial expansion. As has been pointed out by several students of colonial history, British rule in Africa was extended principally through the agency of strong-willed individuals, such as Lugard, who, acquainted with local circumstances, persuaded a reluctant Government to assume fresh responsibilities.

The French, on the contrary, acted a

priori, rather than a *posteriori*. That is to say, expansion was planned and organized, expeditions sent, wars fought, and territories occupied, as a result of decisions taken and sums allocated in Paris. In this way it was decided (agreement having been reached with the British on outstanding questions) to unite the three main French territories in Africa—the West African empire, based on Senegal; Algeria; and the French Congo area—by means of three expeditions, which would converge on Lake Chad. The Congo expedition would leave Libreville under the command of Emile Gentil; the Algerian expedition would cross the Sahara under the command of Foureau and Lamy; and the Senegal expedition—the largest, consisting of 1700 people all told—would march east under the command of Captain Voulet assisted by Lieutenant Chanoine.

The Voulet-Chanoine expedition was among the most disastrous African ventures of the century. Voulet, at the head of such a force, far away from Europe, appears to have become drunk with power. Because some of the villagers through whose country they passed were frightened of so large an expedition, Voulet gave orders that villages which did not pay them respects should be burnt. From here it was but a step to ordering massacres as well. When the news got back to St. Louis, and another officer was sent to take over command in Voulet's place, he caught up with the expedition by following a trail marked by burnt villages, and littered with corpses.

When he arrived he was shot down by Voulet's command—an event that took place on Bastille Day in Sokoto, which, incidentally, was technically considered to be British-controlled. After this, Voulet told his Senegalese troops that he and they were outlaws, and proposed that they all march away together and found their own African empire. The Senegalese, however, preferred to return home. Having themselves condemned and shot Voulet and Chanoine, they handed over command of the expedition to another French officer. After this the expedition proceeded to the agreed upon rendezvous at Lake Chad.

The three expeditions joined forces on April 22, 1900. Their task, however, was

not yet over. They had orders to deal with the Sultan of Bornu, who was named Rabah Zobeir. Rabah, a former slave of Arab-African origin, after adventures in the Sudan (which ended with his defeat by Anglo-French forces) had become Sultan of Bornu, after which he placed himself under British protection. He then conceived the project of founding a new buffer state in the vacuum which then existed in fact if not in theory between the French and the English colonial systems of administration. Neither the French nor the English, however, who had just decided to follow a moderately co-operative policy, wished for a buffer state. The combined expeditions accordingly attacked Rabah, and, after inflicting a decisive defeat on his army, cut off his head. French rule in Africa had become *de facto* as well as theoretical.

In establishing this brief historical outline, we have considered primarily the extension of French power from Senegal to West and Equatorial Africa. The story of the French in North Africa, which, as an incidental consequence of the crisis which has arisen there, has become more generally known, has barely been mentioned. For the sake of unity, other aspects of French influence in Africa have also been omitted or glossed over. Two such aspects which deserve mention, however, concern the French in Ethiopia, and the French in the Congo.

Had the French succeeded in establishing themselves in Ethiopia, the trans-African axis stretching from Senegal to Somaliland might have been more easily achieved. In the earlier part of the nineteenth century, two Franco-Irish brothers, named Antoine and Arnaud d'Abbadie, travelled in the then almost mythical kingdom of Ethiopia from 1838 to 1853. Upon their return they published an account of their travels, which led to further Franco-Ethiopian contacts. As a result, other European powers came to regard Ethiopia as a French zone of influence.

France, however, found herself in the same situation as other European powers in Africa in that her ambitions exceeded her means. It did not therefore prove possible for the French to consolidate the influence that they once possessed in this remote realm.

Earlier mention was made of the circumstance whereby King Denis of Mpongwe placed Gabon under French protection. It was in Gabon, in 1848, that Libreville was founded—like its namesake, Freetown, with a cargo of repatriated slaves. In the course of the nineteenth century, Gabon was twice offered to Britain in exchange for the Gambia, but without result. The situation was transformed, however, as a result of the activities of Savorgnan de Brazza, a Venetian who joined the French Navy, and adopted French nationality. Penetrating the hinterland, between 1883 and 1885, he made a series of treaties with local African chiefs which placed 500,000 square miles of territory under French protection.

The rivalry which arose between Stanley, who was engaged in similar activities on behalf of the King of the Belgians, Leopold II, and de Brazza is well known. De Brazza's initiative, however, did not have happy results. It was in the French Congo that the worst excesses of the "concessionaire" system, whereby large areas were leased by government agencies to private individuals to exploit as they wished, took place. The workings of this unregulated system proved almost as catastrophic in the French Congo as they did during the same period in the Congo Free State.

In 1905, de Brazza—who had been himself Governor of the French Congo until 1897—was sent there once more charged with making an investigation. He wrote his report, which rumor stated to be a strong condemnation of the practices of the period, but died at Dakar on his way home. The report has never been published, but shortly thereafter reforms were instituted which eliminated the worst features of the "concessionaire" system.

The Future of France in Africa

Since the "pacification" of the enormous expanse of French Africa, great changes have been effected in the various territories. Although, like all European colonial systems in Africa, the French colonial system has suffered congenitally from the disease of gigantism, industrialization and Western education have nevertheless had a significant

effect. Part of the proof of this is the rising demand which is now being felt throughout French Africa for national self-government. This demand made itself so strongly and so unexpectedly felt at the R.D.A. Conference at Bamako in the fall of 1957 that even such an astute African leader as Felix Houphouët-Boigny was taken by surprise. With sporadic violence attributable to the same political cause not only in Algeria but also in such widely separated areas as, for example, Mauritania and the Cameroons, it is evident that a nationalistic earthquake, similar to that which has so rudely shaken the colonial structures in Asia, is imminent in Africa.

This fact has been recognized for some time by French colonial policy makers, who have made imaginative attempts to adapt to new circumstances in such a way as to maintain a modicum of French control over France's African territories. Three of these attempts may be considered—the *Loi-Cadre*, the O.C.R.S. (Sahara Plan), and the European Economic Community.²

The *Loi Cadre* of June 23, 1956, is a "skeletal law" which permits the detailed provisions to be filled in at a later date, that is to say at the most appropriate moment, by simple decree. The *Loi Cadre* provides in principle for the establishment of universal suffrage elections to territorial assemblies in France's 12 West and Equatorial African territories—Mauritania, the Sudan, the Niger, Senegal, the Upper Volta, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Chad, Ubangi-Shari, Gabon and Middle Congo.

Hailed in France as a democratic revolution on the one hand, and bitterly attacked by the rising generation of nationalists on the other as a trick designed to maintain French rule while conveying the impression of independence, the *Loi Cadre* has, since the Bamako Conference of last year, appeared to close observers to be an insufficiently satisfying concession to the peoples concerned.

The Sahara Plan—officially known as O.C.R.S. (the Common Organization of the Sahara Regions)—is primarily economic in purpose, although it has evident political ramifications. After the recent economic re-

² For the text of this agreement, see pp. 112-115.

evaluation by French technicians of the mineral resources of the Sahara, the decision was taken by the French Assembly in December, 1956, to establish this organization.

O.C.R.S. is to be led by a Governor-Delegate, who will preside over a management committee, which will be primarily concerned with military and technical matters. The territories involved include nine-tenths of the surface of Algeria, the Northern parts of the French Sudan, the Niger, and Chad. Different interpretations have been placed upon the workings of O.C.R.S. by different persons involved. On the French side, the plan is seen as a new and practical method of administering an area that has recently acquired unexpected value.

On the African side Houphouet-Boigny has seen in the scheme a method of ensuring that the industrial superstructure that will arise as a result of the exploitation of the Saharian wealth will be located on African soil. He has also envisaged the uniting of the areas affected into a single colony, which in future decades will come to provide the industrial heartland of a new and mighty West Africa. The overwhelming majority of other African political leaders appear, however, to have rejected the Sahara Plan in toto as French-inspired, and to have dismissed Houphouet as, at best, a victim of French diplomacy and of his own dreams. Furthermore the idea of incorporating parts of the Sudan, Niger or Chad into another colony, either for political or for economic reasons, has been strongly contested by local African leaders.

Between the concept of O.C.R.S. and of the third scheme—the European Common Market—there lies, chronologically, the Anglo-French attack on Suez. At so close a point in time it is still difficult to realize what an immense watershed this brief military venture is proving in the political history of twentieth century Africa. In a decade when fear of “colonialism” was a powerful motivation in African affairs, this fear found apparent justification in the Anglo-French action against Egypt.³

As a result of this the French, in considering African problems, found that what was politically and psychologically possible in 1956 was no longer so in 1957. However,

instead of interpreting this setback as a sign that a different approach was called for, the effect of Suez appears to be simply to have strengthened the French in their determination to follow the Athenian precept that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” This philosophy appears to have expression in the European Economic Community.

The European Economic Community (E.E.C.) has, according to its title, no connection with Africa. In effect, however, the terms of the treaty state that “the Member States agree to associate with the Community the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands.” The territories concerned are then listed in Annex IV of the Treaty.⁴ They include all of France’s 12 African territories, as well as the two African trust territories that she administers for the U.N. (Algeria is also mentioned in the treaty, though not in the Annex). The most significant fact, however, is that the Federal Republic of Germany is one of the member states, and has the same number of votes—33—as France, against, for example, Belgium’s 11 votes. West Germany is also, like France, to contribute an initial \$200 million.

The E.E.C. has naturally received much publicity in Europe, the bulk of it favorable if not enthusiastic. A number of writers, moreover, have treated the E.E.C. as a project which will lay the foundations for a much more far-reaching scheme—Eurafrica. As one French writer expressed it last August: “The martyrdom of Hungary underlined the dramatic urgency for the free nations of Europe to unite militarily, economically, and politically, and create Eurafrica. For Africa is the natural complement of, and is vital to the defense, life, and subsistence of this continent.”⁴ From this point

³ In considering the history of the French in Africa it is not without interest to remember that Leibnitz advised Louis XIV to capture Egypt on the ground that it constituted the gateway to India. Although Louis did not follow this advice, the Leibnitz memoir was preserved, and is believed to have provided the basis for the decision, taken by the Directoire, to send Napoleon on his Egyptian campaign. It will also be remembered that Saint Louis led the Fifth Crusade against Egypt in the thirteenth century.

⁴ For the text of this section see pages 111-115 of this issue.

⁵ Maurice Moyal, “What Prospect for Eurafrica?” *New Commonwealth*, August 5, 1957.

to claiming that it is the "manifest destiny" of Europe to move into and take over Africa is but a step. The only question outstanding is the role that Britain may play vis a vis the signatories of the Rome Treaty.

Meanwhile the implications of E.E.C. for Africa have not gone unnoticed, either by the Africans, or by the United Nations. Most critics have emphasized the fact that while economic cooperation is obviously a desirable goal, as is the establishment of a European Community, the disturbing feature of E.E.C. is that the African populations directly affected by its provisions have not been consulted regarding their views. Nor, it is pointed out, does France intend to have the Africans consulted in this matter.

When the question was raised at the United Nations Committee for Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, France stated that she had no obligation to supply information on the subject to the international community. Since the E.E.C. would not be established before 1958, information on the subject could not therefore be transmitted until 1959, and the matter could not therefore be discussed until 1960. In other words French policy was to confront the world with a *fait accompli*.

Critics of E.E.C. have, however, pointed out that the undemocratic nature of the community is underscored even by its opening words, for the text of the treaty begins "The High Contracting Parties . . .," which stands in marked contrast to the opening words of the U.N. Charter—"We the peoples of the United Nations. . . ." Considerable unease has also been caused by the provision that the free movement of workers between the territories concerned shall be permitted. Natural as this may sound in principle, in practice it is liable to mean that white settlers may flow unchecked into French Africa, whereas African workers are not in a position to move freely into France, since most of them do not have the money to travel there, and those who do would have to compete for jobs with repatriated colons from Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. The long-term effects of such a policy upon the African territories are obvious.

This much can be said. French policy towards Africa has been marked by alter-

nate moods—extreme liberalism followed by extreme reaction. At the moment, despite a legalistic appearance of liberalism, as evidenced, for example, by the *Loi Cadre*, the dominant psychological mood of the French is one of reaction. If the historic pattern is to be repeated, we may expect an eventual reversion to the other extreme. Yet so unprecedented has been the recent reactionary mood, in Algeria and elsewhere, that the corresponding mood of liberalism may likewise be expected to take an unprecedented form.

A colonial revolution is at hand. Let it not be forgotten that when in 1789 it became evident that France could not continue any longer as she was going, and the Estates General were called together for the first time for almost 200 years, the mood which prevailed was one of extreme liberalism—a liberalism so extreme that it could not be controlled, and led straightaway into the events of the French Revolution.

Yet another pattern also lies ready to hand to be followed. The relatively cordial relationship established by France's colonial rival—Britain—in the case of Ghana has not passed unnoticed. Gallieni, together with Lyautey the hero of the golden era of French colonisation, used to emphasize the necessity for just such a flexible approach to colonial problems.

If, in the face of the tidal wave of nationalism which is now rising against France in Africa, France can show the imagination of a Gallieni, and can relegate power to those who understand nationalism, such as Sekou Toure or Ouezzin Coulibaly, France may yet exercise her creative influence in African affairs.

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The term "Maghreb," though convenient, needs explanation. Literally it means simply "the West"; so that where the Maghreb lies depends to some extent upon the point of observation. Conventionally it has come to be used for the region of North Africa, west of Egypt, into which Islam penetrated in the seventh century and established itself firmly by the twelfth, and where Arab culture and language have gradually achieved predominance. Even so, though unquestionably Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are regarded by their inhabitants and neighbours as collectively belonging to the Maghreb, there is less certainty about the peripheral regions. Does Libya (or Tripolitania) belong also? This is certainly the view of many Tunisians; and President Bourguiba has publicly referred to Libya as the fourth state in the Maghreb constellation. It is less clear whether this view is shared by Libyans, or at least by the existing Libyan regime.

On the other hand, for the Moroccans—and particularly for the dominant Moroccan party, Istiqlal—who, for obvious geographical reasons are less interested in the Libyan connections, Shinqit (the region of the western Sahara, including Spanish Rio de Oro and French Mauretania, historically associated with Morocco) is essentially part of the Maghreb.

Thus, while the notion of "the Maghreb" is useful and necessary, has a clear general meaning, and provides at the present time a symbol around which popular loyalties and aspirations can cluster, like any other national symbol—e.g., "Hellas," "Italia"—it is only in the course of history that it is likely to be defined precisely.

France and the Maghreb

By THOMAS HODGKIN

Author of "Nationalism and Colonial Africa"

MUCH of the ample literature dealing with the Maghreb produced during the past decade falls into the category of apologetics. Its object has been less to enlarge human knowledge than to justify a thesis—most often the doctrine of the *Présence Française* in North Africa. This has given it a somewhat ephemeral character. Many of the issues which have been the subject of prolonged debate—for example, the deposition of the Sultan (now the King) of Morocco, Mohammed V, by the former French Protectorate Government, and the substitution of Ben Arafa—are now dead issues.

Apologetics apart, any discussion of Maghreb-French relations is liable to suffer from the distortions arising from too close a view, too much preoccupation with the specious present. On the basis of the available evidence, any judgment which might be made about the future prospects of

Maghreb-French co-operation in the political, strategic, economic, cultural or any other field is liable to be upset by some sudden (and, for mortals, unpredictable) transformation of the contemporary situation.

If—to take two polar extremes—the French Government were tomorrow to accept the principle of Algerian independence, and set about negotiating an agreement with the National Council of the Algerian Revolution to give Algeria the same sovereign status enjoyed by Tunisia and Morocco, this would remove the main present cause of tension between those two States and France. If, however, the same French Government, by conscious choice or sheer ineptitude, were to become engulfed in a major war with the entire Maghreb, this would not only reduce towards zero the prospects of Maghreb-French co-operation, but would at the same time have far-

reaching repercussions in other parts of the Arab and African worlds.

In practice, perhaps, French policy will continue to oscillate between these two extremes. But, given the wide range of future possibilities, the best way of avoiding making the kind of assessment which will be irrelevant in twelve months' time is to pose two strictly limited questions: First, what are the main political forces at present operating in the Maghreb? Second, assuming that France and the Maghreb must be regarded as distinct centres of power, what are the factors making for conflict and for co-operation between them?

What gives the peoples of the Maghreb their sense of unity—over and above the ties of Islam and Arabic, which link them also with two wider communities? This is a question which can be answered, tentatively, in various ways. It is probably not far-fetched to regard the Berber tradition (overlaid by successive waves of Phoenician, Roman, Vandal, Byzantine and Arab penetration) as still tenacious—not merely among the substantial populations, in Morocco and Algeria, who have retained the Berber language and social institutions, but also among the essentially Arabised majority. (In this respect the revolutionaries of F.L.N., the Algerian National Liberation Front, with their emphasis upon direct democracy and their dislike of external authority and outstanding leaders, are the direct heirs of the fourth century Donatists and the eighth-ninth century Kharijists. "Nous sommes peut-être un peu anarchistes," as one F.L.N. supporter, a Berber from the Aurès, candidly put it.)

Politically, there have been recurrent efforts, since the time of Massinissa in the second century B.C. (and again under Kahina, the priestess-queen, who led the resistance to the Arab invasions at the end of the seventh century A.D.) to achieve Maghreb unity; and, under the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the greater part of the Maghreb was in fact united under a single government. Even during the later periods of political division there seems to have been something in the nature of a common pattern of government in the Maghreb,

which "never knew the deep gulf between military and civilian elements, or . . . between rulers and population which was characteristic . . . of the Muslim East."


The Sufi brotherhoods, which developed particularly vigorously in the Maghreb from the fifteenth century on—with their common rituals, peregrinations of holy men, pilgrimages to saints' tombs, etc.—though now a declining force, have in the past provided important social, as well as religious, ties between geographically remote communities. In the field of architecture, the domestic arts, music, and the like, there is an evident common Maghreb (or "Hispano-Mauresque") tradition. (I remember a Moroccan politician contrasting the relative vitality of Maghreb culture with the dominance of Western styles among the Egyptian bourgeois.)

Finally, the fact that between 1912 and 1956 the entire region was controlled by a single colonial power, France; that the leadership of the modern national movements which began to develop after the first World War was largely drawn from the French-educated élites; that the national struggles in the three territories were directed against administrations and policies which, in spite of certain points of difference, recognisably belonged to the same family—these were obviously important factors stimulating the idea of the Maghreb as a unity, whose peoples shared a common destiny. The forcing-house of pan-Maghreb thinking, as Professor Charles André Julien has explained, was Paris, rather than Tunis, or indeed Cairo.

Reaction to Colonialism

Every colonial system seems to dig its own grave in its own way: or—to put it less metaphorically—to produce a specific set of reactions on the side of the peoples colonised which are at the same time the product, and the contradiction, of its policies. In the case of the Maghreb, it is well to consider, first, the broad lines along which these reactions have developed throughout the region; and, second, the specific forms of organisation which have come to dominate each of the three territories. In this

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way it should be possible to distinguish the general and the special characteristics of the North African national movements.

On the religious level opposition has mainly been directed against *maraboutisme*—the saint-worship associated with the Sufi

brotherhoods—and the tendency of the French administration (above all in Morocco) to seek allies among the *marabouts*, to use religious obscurantism as a tool of colonial policy.

This reaction has expressed itself partly through the reforming movement known as the Salafiyya, which drew its main inspiration from the great Al-Azhar teacher and reformer, Mohammed 'Abdu (1849-1905). In Algeria this movement was particularly associated with the teaching of 'Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis, with the organisation commonly known as the 'Ulema (*Jami'iyya al-'ulama al-muslihin al-jaza'iriyin*), and the journal, *al-Basa'ir* (at present both suppressed by the French authorities); in Morocco with Muhammad ben al-'Arbi al-'Alawi and Allal al-Fasi (the president of Istiqlal).

Partly also this opposition has taken a "modernist" form, best expressed in the attitude of Neo-Destour (the dominant party in Tunisia)—with its new marriage laws abolishing polygamy, reforming divorce procedure, and granting women the right to make their own marriage contracts; the introduction of women's suffrage; and the merging of al-Zeituna, the traditional centre of Muslim scholarship, at its primary and secondary levels with the public educational system.

Cultural Opposition

On the cultural level, the main effort has been directed towards the assertion of the claims of Arab culture and the Arabic language against French assimilationism, expressed through the network of independent schools providing instruction in Arabic up to the secondary level (established under "reformist" auspices, chiefly in Morocco and Algeria); the development of an Arabic press; the organisation of theatrical companies, presenting plays, dealing with contemporary social themes in Arabic (in loose association with Istiqlal in Morocco); youth and scouts' organisations (for both sexes), with their national symbols, their new forms of civic education, their patriotic songs. Here again, though there has been a common objective, there have been variations

among the three territories.

In Morocco the ninth century University of *Qairawiyin* at Fez (where Allal al-Fasi at one time taught) acted as a focus of resistance to French cultural pressures, while in Tunisia the *College Sadiqi* provided an excellent education in Arabic as well as French for many of the new élite. It is in Algeria, where the dogma that "Algeria is France" has involved the application of assimilationism in its most thorough-going form over the longest period—where the mass of the Arab population has conventionally been regarded as "inferior and ineducable," referred to as *bicots*, and the élite in large part detached from its language—that the revolt against French cultural domination has been most pronounced.

Labor Movements

On the economic level, the rapid tempo of industrial and commercial development, the growth of large modern towns (like Casablanca, with its population of 750,000) with their vast *bidonvilles*, the consequent proletarianisation of Maghreb peasants and nomads, the partial correlation of employer-worker relationships with French-Arab relationships, the prevalence of unemployment (actual and disguised) have stimulated the development of nationally oriented Trade Union movements—U.M.T. in Morocco, U.G.T.T. in Tunisia, and U.G.T.A. in Algeria.

These movements (which are affiliated with the I.C.F.T.U.) have been closely associated with the dominant political organisations in each territory (Istiqlal, Neo-Destour, and F.L.N.), and have functioned, during the period of struggle for national independence, as a kind of industrial wing of the political movement. At the same time they have preserved their own specific economic and social objectives and programmes. Of the three the oldest, and probably the best organised, is the U.G.T.T. (with a present membership of about 150,000), whose main organiser and leader, Ferhat Hached, was assassinated—it is widely believed, on the orders of the French Administration—during the Tunisian time of troubles, and has become a national hero.

Other types of economic organisation—e.g., of traders and farmers—have also been developed (especially in Tunisia). Indeed, agrarian discontent has been another major stimulus to growth of national movements: again, this aspect has been particularly marked in the case of the Algerian revolution, where land alienation to European settlers has taken place on the largest scale (involving approximately two-fifths of the total cultivable land area, as contrasted with one-fifth in Tunisia and one-ninth in Morocco).

Politically, though there have been important divergencies in the forms of organisation thrown up and the methods used, opposition to French colonial power has passed through four main phases. First, there was the period of armed resistance under what can broadly be described as "traditional" leadership, beginning with Abd el-Qadir's revolt (shortly after the French moved into Algeria in 1830), and ending with Abd el-Krim's Independent Republic of the Rif in 1925. Second, came the phase of nationalist agitation and the organisation of pressure groups in the period immediately following the first World War, associated particularly with the Pan-Maghreb teaching of Shekib Arslan, the foundation of the original *Destour* party (*Hizb el-hurr el-destouri*) in Tunisia in 1920, the underground *Etoile Nord-Africaine* in Algeria in 1925, and in Morocco the *Comité d'Action Marocaine* in 1934.

Third was the phase in which it became possible to organise mass political parties of a modern type (alternating between semi-legality and clandestinity)—Neo-Destour in Tunisia (1934), the *Parti du Peuple Algérien* (1937), reborn as the M.T.L.D. (*Mouvement pour la Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques*, 1947), in Algeria, and Istiqlal (1943) in Morocco. Finally, came the stage of revolutionary struggle—relatively brief in Tunisia and Morocco, but prolonged already for more than three years in Algeria—with the creation, in Morocco and Algeria, of Armies of Liberation under political leadership.

The contemporary political situation in the three states of the Maghreb can be provisionally summarised as follows: a temporary

equilibrium between various national interests and groupings in Morocco; virtual one-party rule in Tunisia; and the dominance of a revolutionary national front (confronted by a foreign military dictatorship) in Algeria. Each of these situations needs closer examination.

Morocco

In Morocco, the monarchy enjoys a position of peculiar authority. It has approximately as long a history as the British monarchy. The 'Alawi dynasty to which the present King (formerly Sultan), Mohammed V, belongs dates back to the middle of the seventeenth century, and claims descent from the Prophet. Traditionally the Sultan of Morocco has enjoyed spiritual as well as secular power: as the Commander of the Faithful, within western Islam, he possesses special *baraka*, hereditary sanctity.

But in the case of Mohammed V, these *ex officio* qualities are strengthened by his own personal abilities and achievements: by choosing to side with Istiqlal and the Moroccan national movement rather than with the French Protectorate Government, by permitting or encouraging his family to associate themselves with progressive causes (the movement for women's emancipation, for example), and above all by his period of exile in Madagascar in 1953-1955 following his deposition by the French, the Sultan has succeeded in establishing himself as the chief symbol of the reborn Moroccan nation. His pictures are displayed on every wall and in every shop. He has also taken pains to culti-

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vate good relationships with popular organisations of a variety of kinds, e.g., the U.M.T., as well as with independent political leaders; and has attempted to strengthen the dynasty by securing the post of Chief of Staff of the new Royal Army for his son, Prince Moulay Hassan, whom he has also recognised as heir to the throne.

At the same time there are other centres of power in Morocco: Istiqlal itself, which is at present the major partner in the Government; P.D.I. (the *Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance*), the main opposition party; the Trade Unions (U.M.T.); and the Army of Liberation, still operative in the South and in the disputed Saharan regions. Of these Istiqlal is unquestionably the most important (P.D.I. is a predominantly middle-class party, with a restricted following).

Istiqlal, under the leadership first of Allal al-Fasi and later of Ahmed Balafrej (now Moroccan Foreign Minister), succeeded between 1944 and 1956 in building up a highly efficient hierarchical form of party organisation—leading from small cells (limited, during periods of severe repression, to three to five members) in streets and villages up to the central executive. While its membership never rose much above 100,000 during the difficult times of the Protectorate, after Independence, in 1956, it leapt to a million and a half. This means that Istiqlal possesses a mass organisation such as no other corporate interest in Morocco (including the monarchy) controls. Its very intelligent and capable General Secretary, Mehdi ben Barka, is at the same time President of the Moroccan Consultative Assembly (which functions as the main national mouthpiece of popular opinion in the interval until a Constituent Assembly is elected and a system of parliamentary government established). In addition local administration appears to be effectively controlled by Istiqlal, or by appointees sympathetic to Istiqlal.

In matters of policy Istiqlal is naturally in general more radical than the monarchy. But like all mass nationalist parties of this type, it contains within itself various competing standpoints—conservative and radical, Muslim-traditionalist and secular-modernist, capitalist and proletarian. The

present equilibrium within Istiqlal, and even more the equilibrium between Istiqlal and other interests, are in large part a function of the state of insecurity, arising directly out of the Algerian war, in which the Moroccan nation finds itself, which acts as a check upon internal political conflict.

Tunisia

The Tunisian situation appears on the surface simpler. The only effective political force is Neo-Destour, the oldest and most mature of the Maghreb parties. Tunisia is a one-party state, in the sense that Neo-Destour controls the Government, holds all the seats in the Constituent Assembly, secured an overwhelming vote in favour of the lists which it sponsored in the 1957 municipal elections and is dominant throughout the country. Yet it would be incorrect to regard the regime as a dictatorship. At least, it should be described as a "popular," or "democratic," indeed a "liberal" dictatorship. Other political parties are tolerated: for example there is an extremely small Communist party, which contested the Tunis municipal elections, but won no seats.

What has in fact occurred is that Neo-Destour, after more than 20 years of organised effort to achieve Tunisian independence, emerged in 1956 without any serious competitor. The Bey possessed neither the hereditary status nor the record of achievement of the Sultan of Morocco: the institution was generally regarded as outmoded; and when, in August, 1957, President Bourguiba and his Government decided to abolish it, there was no evidence of opposition. The Vieux-Destour, representing the Muslim-traditionalist wing of the national movement, had virtually ceased to function or been absorbed in the dominant party. Thus, to an even greater extent than in the case of Istiqlal, it is almost wholly within the dominant party that the democratic processes of controversy and debate, pressure and counter-pressure, take place.

Here there are probably three main trends of opinion. First, there is *Bourguibisme*, which owes its present predominance partly to the fact that in Tunisia it is M. Bourguiba

who has established himself as the principal national symbol. The ideology of *Bourguibisme* seems chiefly to imply a Cartesian emphasis on the primacy of reason, respect for liberal-democratic values, belief in gradualism, non-violence and methods of conciliation, and, in international relations, a broadly Western and (so far as French policy will permit) Francophile orientation—"co-operation libre avec la France."

Second, there is the attitude associated with the Trade Union movement, in which the dominant figure (since the death of Ferhat Abbas) has been M. Ahmed ben Salah, at present a member of the Government, differing mainly from *Bourguibisme* in its demand for more economic planning and a more progressive social policy—somewhat on British Labour party lines.

Finally, though *Youssefisme* no longer officially operates as an ideology (since its main spokesman, M. Salah ben Youssef, the former General Secretary of Neo-Destour, broke with the party, and withdrew into exile in Egypt), it would be absurd to imagine that the basic ideas with which he was associated—the demand for a more Pan-Arab, pro-Egyptian orientation, greater toughness and less sweet reasonableness as regards relations with France and the West—have ceased to influence the rank-and-file of the party. But the extremely efficient internal discipline of Neo-Destour has so far made it possible for demands of this kind to be canalised and managed on lines broadly consistent with *Bourguibisme*.

Algeria

The Algerian situation differs from the Tunisian and the Moroccan in that the national revolution is still in process, and the political institutions which have been developed follow the classic pattern of a period of revolutionary war. As M. Ferhat Abbas has pointed out, the Algerian people have been faced with more difficult problems than either the Tunisian or the Moroccan. In their cases the Protectorate regime meant that the apparatus of the pre-colonial states in part survived: the Makhzen and the Regency may have been feeble in relation to the overriding power of the French author-

ities, but at least they continued to exist. But the framework of the pre-1830 Algerian state was totally dismantled; the sheer existence of an Algerian nation was questioned (by M. Ferhat Abbas himself at one time). Hence the Algerian nationalists were obliged to make a wholly new beginning—to frame a form of government for themselves.

The F.L.N. (or National Liberation Front), the principal organ of the Algerian revolution, emerged in the somewhat confused situation which existed in 1954. The mass party, M.T.L.D., was split between the great personality who had led the Algerian national movement for the past 30 years, Messali Hajj, and his supporters (the *Messalistes*), and the younger intellectuals who controlled the party's central committee (the *Centralistes*), who accused Messali of remoteness from the real world, inefficient agitation, and talking about revolution rather than making it—of "failing to make a synthesis between Blanquism and Islam."

In this situation a third group, calling itself the *Comité Revolutionnaire pour l'Unité et l'Action* (C.R.U.A.), came into being, consisting mainly of relatively young men, many of whom had had military experience, and had studied politics during periods of imprisonment. C.R.U.A. criticised both sides, demanded national unity, and launched the revolution of November 1, 1954. All Algerian political organisations were forthwith made illegal; and F.L.N., the offspring of C.R.U.A., was joined by the *Centralistes* and by the majority of the activists and rank-and-file of M.T.L.D.; by the other major Algerian party, the *Union Démocratique de la Manifeste Algérienne* (U.D.M.A.)—a moderate, modernist, predominantly middle-class organisation, led by M. Ferhat Abbas; and by the *'Ulama* (the reformist Muslim group referred to above).

Only the Communists—regarded by the nationalists as a French-controlled party—and a rump of irreconcilable *Messalistes* remained outside: the latter created a separate grouping, the *Mouvement National Algérien* (M.N.A.), with some following among Algerian workers in France, but little effective support in Algeria, where it tended increasingly to serve the ends of French propaganda rather than of popular struggle.

The organisation of the closely interlocking F.L.N. and Army of Liberation is based on two main principles: the authority of the political leadership (centred in the nine-member National Council of the Algerian Revolution over the military leadership (organised on the basis of six *wilayat*, or Commands); and the authority of the interior (i.e., the elements of the leadership operating within Algeria) over the exterior (i.e., the elements established outside, at the United Nations, Cairo, Tunis, and so forth). Within the Army the military commander at each level is assisted by a *Commissaire Politique*, especially responsible for liaison with the local authorities of F.L.N. and the welfare of the civilian population in his area. In what are known as the *zones libres*, and to a less extent in the areas which remain under French occupation, the rudiments of a new form of state—with its own elected assemblies, courts of justice, police, system of taxation, medical services, schools, mass education, and so forth—are already in being.

The ideology of F.L.N. might be described as "pre-Communist radical": (It is indeed in certain respects markedly anti-Communist—not even former members of the Communist party are permitted to hold posts of responsibility within the organisation.) Its main emphasis—in its publications and political education (both civilian and military)—is on the essentially "popular" character of the revolution it is making, involving more far-reaching measures of agrarian and social reform than have as yet been attempted in Tunisia and Morocco; on the principle of collective responsibility, as opposed to personal leadership; on the rejection of *racisme* in all its forms—involving complete equality of rights for the European and Jewish minorities with Algerian Muslims; and on the necessity for the future independent Algerian nation (*Al-Jaza'ir*) to participate in a unified Maghreb. Far from being inspired by Egypt or the Arab world, F.L.N. regards *Al-Jaza'ir*, and indeed the Maghreb as a whole, as having already reached a more advanced stage of political development than the Arab peoples of the Middle East.

What, in this situation, are the main fac-

tors making for conflict and for co-operation between the Maghreb and France? While obviously in present circumstances the basic cause of conflict is the Algerian War, it is important to recognise the issues which the war raises. It is not merely that the largely common culture and aspirations of the Maghreb peoples naturally produce a sentiment of solidarity. There is also a sense of danger. The independence of Tunisia and Morocco is seen as implying, logically, the independence of Algeria—just as for France the colonisation of Algeria implied the eventual extension of colonial power into Tunisia and Morocco. In this respect the Algerian Army of Liberation can be regarded as essential to the defence of the entire Maghreb.

Basic Issues

So long as a French Army of half a million remains in occupation of Algeria, Tunisians and Moroccans are bound to feel their own independence insecure. It is even possible that this French army, which has already shown that it is largely a law to itself, and has acquired a habit of exterminating North African Muslims, if once it could re-establish its control over Algeria, might spread the war into the two adjacent states, from which France withdrew in 1955-1956 for reasons of tactics rather than conviction.

Indeed, in a sense the war *has* already spread, particularly into Tunisia. *Ratissages* take place: follow-up operations are conducted by French units in Algeria against the Army of Liberation, or against Algerian refugees, involving their penetration into Tunisian or Moroccan territory and clashes with the still quite inadequate local forces. Provocative behaviour on the part of the French troops still stationed in Tunisia and Morocco can lead (as at Gabès last June) to incidents and bloodshed.

Moreover, there has been a continual flow of Algerian refugees across the frontiers into Tunisia and Morocco—with experiences of homes burned, cattle and crops destroyed, relatives killed or "detained for questioning," in some cases having themselves suffered the peculiarly brutal varieties of torture which the French authorities have de-

vised. This raises acute problems of feeding, clothing, housing and work, with which the two Governments have not the resources to cope. (At Oudja alone there are now some 75,000 refugees in a condition of near-starvation: along the Tunisian frontier the situation is equally grim.) Thus, even if the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments were willing to accept continued French domination of Algeria—which they are not—public opinion in the two countries, particularly within Neo-Destour and Istiqlal, would make such a policy impossible.

War in Algeria

The deeper roots of the continuing war in Algeria, which are at the same time causes of continuing French-Maghreb conflict, have been sufficiently discussed elsewhere. There is the French *illusion de la grandeur*, the pathological desire to be a Great Power, of which M. Bourguiba has spoken, and the withdrawal into the world of fantasy which is its consequence (e.g., the fantasy that the Algerian revolution can be explained by reference to external influences—Egyptian, Soviet, American, or United Nations). There are the lobbies of the European *colons*, unwilling to face the psychological and social adjustments which the change-over from a ruling to a minority status inevitably involves.

There are the important new possibilities for the development of Saharan oil and mineral resources, and the illusion that only if the *Presence Française* (in the sense of French military and political control) can be maintained in the Sahara can French business interests secure sufficient reward and France sufficient economic advantage; and the fear that, if once Algeria becomes independent, this will weaken France's position in *Shinqit* and in the southern marches of the Sahara. A further indirect cause of conflict is the *immobilisme* which haunts the Fourth Republic, with its implication that those most likely to exercise political power are in general those least capable of making major decisions.

Yet there are many reasons why—if the

Algerian war can be ended, and France can recognise that an independent Maghreb is historically as necessary as an independent India (or an independent France)—co-operation between these two Mediterranean systems should be close and fruitful. The economies of all three Maghreb States have been tied in with the French economy; and, though it seems unlikely that the present basis of relationships—whereby substantial French subsidies are received in return for a quasi-monopolistic outlet for French products—can be preserved indefinitely, yet the political leaders of the Maghreb are plainly anxious for the co-operation of French capital, management and technicians in the modernisation of their region, including its Saharan resources. Some scaling down of the French communities in the Maghreb (involving particularly the economically most vulnerable groups, the *petits blancs*) is doubtless unavoidable—but in Tunisia and Morocco it is estimated that only about 10 per cent of the Europeans have actually gone.

Cooperation with the Maghreb

In a wide range of technical fields—agriculture, forestry, water supplies, communications, medical services, broadcasting and the cinema—the Maghreb élite is used to working with, and learning from, French specialists. Most important of all, Maghreb educational systems (especially at the higher levels) are French-centred; and their expansion (which is urgently required) demands the co-operation of French universities, training colleges, technical institutions, and the like.

Moreover, the Maghreb élite has been profoundly influenced by French culture; many think in French more easily than in Arabic; the Algerian Army of Liberation, while its songs and dispatches are in Arabic, keeps its records in French. French civilisation is conceived as essentially different from French colonialism. Maghreb nationalists emphasise the difference between those whom they call *les vrais français* and the pseudo-French who manage the machine of Algerian repression: respect for Voltaire cannot be taught by S.S. men.

"It will take a very strong man—one who has to put 'national' interests above ethnic interests—to lead both Togo and Cameroon through the present crisis in the nationalist cause." This author pinpoints the problem: "Should independence be granted there is fear that the two countries would be reduced to intergroup bickering and possible bloodshed, a return to a tribal state."

Togo and the Cameroon

BY GEORGE R. HORNER

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DESPITE the thousand or so miles separating Togo and the French Cameroon, and the difference in size—Togo is about eight times smaller than the Cameroon—these countries have more bonds of similarities, historically, geographically, ethnically and politically, than differences. Recent political events have pushed them to the fore both in African and world politics.

Both areas saw the light of their political day in 1884 when Germany, through Bismarck and his agent Nachtigal, signed commercial and political treaties with coastal chiefs making Togo and Kamerun German colonies. At the end of the First World War both colonies were divided by the League of Nations as British and French Mandates; following the Second World War, both became Trust Territories under the same administrators. French Togoland and French Cameroon, our focal areas, became *territoires associées* in 1946 and each voted on the question of "self-determination" within a few months of the other toward the end of 1956.

Geographic similarities include a low, coastal rain forest belt, followed by a high,

dry plateau supporting the horizon-framed grasslands which gradually give way to the deserts in the north, common to both Togoland and the Cameroon.

Although different ethnic groups occupy these territories, they have similar social and political organizations. The coastal groups have more loosely organized social and political organizations; the interior groups are more centrally organized and authoritative in their social and political organizations.

European influence began on the coast in both territories and gradually spread into the interior. Coastal tribes have had longer and more intense contact than interior ones. Social services, particularly education, have trained an élite group, for the most part concentrated in the urban centers along the coastal strip. Both territories are bound by a common language (French), common laws and administration, common interests—and a desire for independence.

Togoland

Togoland has been called the "Cinderella of West Africa," imagined to be menaced and crushed by her two neighboring sister territories, Ghana and Nigeria. Such an appellation is not consistent with the facts, for as a Trust Territory, Togoland is a favored territory receiving the best of French civilization and protectively guarded by the United Nations.

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I want to take this means to thank the African Research & Studies Program of Boston Univ. for funds to permit research in the French Cameroon this past summer, and to the Service de Presse of the French Embassy in New York for statistical material on Togo and the Cameroon. I am responsible for their interpretation.

One of the responsibilities entrusted to France as administrator of Togoland was "to promote political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants." (Article 76, *Charter of the United Nations*). In the recent (November, 1957) debates of the Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations, relative to the present status of Togo, France was complimented on her economic, social and educational development of the territory.

Economic Development

To improve the standard of living for all of its Overseas Territories, including Togo, France established two agencies which are now responsible for the management and allocation of financial aid: the "Central Fund for France Overseas," created in 1941 to finance overseas projects, and the "Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development," popularly known as FIDES, set up in 1946, under the financial administration of the Central Fund, to modernize Overseas Territories.

In order to insure consistent development, the FIDES program was divided into two four year plan phases: 1948-1953 and 1954-1957, which are now coming to an end. From 1946 to 1955 (the latest available figure), Metropolitan France granted more than \$15 million for economic and social development of Togo of which Metropolitan France is financing 75 per cent of the expenditures at an interest rate of only 2.2 per cent.

The economic progress of Togoland was helped by the establishment in 1947 of a "Common Fund" which finances native co-operatives such as fishing, agriculture, and so forth.

Agriculture. Over 1.5 million acres are under cultivation; only 1400 acres are non-native owned. The agricultural area is centered in eastern Togoland among the eastern Ewé group. In addition to the production of food crops for local consumption such as yams, cassava, millets, corn, the Ewé grow the commercially more important cash-crops such as cocoa (over 7,000 tons) and coffee (over 4,300 tons), from which Togo receives more than one half of her income in export. Agricultural progress is being made through

research centers established and supported by FIDES funds.

In 1955, the trade balance showed imports valued at \$17.9 million (\$12 million in 1953) and exports valued at \$22.2 million (\$15.4 million in 1953), indicating, in very general terms, both a favorable and growing balance of trade for the country.

Political Progress

Scarcely 75 years after Nachtigal signed the treaty giving Germany sovereignty over a vague and undefined territory, the people of Togoland were of sufficient political maturity to vote in a referendum proposing to continue the same status or to establish a "self-governing Togolese Republic freely associated with France." On October 28, 1956, the voting population of Togoland voted in favor of the new statute, ending the U. N. Trusteeship over Togoland." The United Nations recognized neither the elections, which it did not supervise, nor that the Trusteeship had come to an end. France was admonished by the United Nations for having pushed this final step in a progressing political evolution too rapidly.

This attempt to accelerate the political progress of Togo by France through a rapid merging of conflicting ethnic loyalties and interests has pushed Togo to the foreground of international political interests.

Divergent ethnic groups. The north-south territorial boundaries of 1885-1895 cut through the east-west cultural boundaries of the diverse ethnic groups. In this division such northern tribes as the Kotokoli, Bassari, Moba, Konkomba and Chokossi were half in (then) Germany and British territory, today, Ghana and French Togoland. Of the southern ethnic groups only the Ewé are bifurcated. (Before the plebiscite of May 9, 1956, the Ewé were "trifurcated" with parts of the group in the Gold Coast, part in British Togoland and a third group in French Togoland. Since the plebiscite British Togoland, including some Ewé, joined Ghana.

Such divisions forced members of the divided tribes to learn different European languages, to be administered by different European laws and political institutions, ac-

cording to almost opposite points of view of how colonial peoples should be ruled. For example, the British in their African colonial administration carried out the principle of indirect rule, permitting traditional chiefs authority over their own tribes. This was in contrast to the French, who as a matter of policy, tended to ignore ethnic groupings in favor of territorial integration and unity.

Further to complicate the problem of political progress, these tribes represent different social and political organizations among themselves. The Voltaic peoples, northern Togo pastoral nomads, have strong centrally organized political organizations with authority centered in traditional chiefs, living within well-defined territorial boundaries. The central and southern tribes, Benin peoples, have loosely constructed administrative organizations, lacking a central authority, but with allocated authority for village elders.

The Ewé, although widely distributed throughout the southern region of the territory, were never a unified tribe. In fact, this group was divided into an eastern, central and western Ewé, each with its own social and political organizations, often influenced by more dominant ethnic groups. Such were only the ethnic differences which have become problems in the formation of a "national unity."

Nor is this all. White contact—missions, administration and commerce—came first to the Ewé and other coastal ethnic groups. Educational opportunities for these groups have produced a highly sophisticated, politically astute élite, for the most part Ewé who have become leaders in unions and political movements, as well as a trained government personnel. Most of the élite live in Lomé, capital, port and chief city. Northern tribes, who have had less white contact, have remained traditionally oriented and have resisted any social or political progress. These ethnic differences and the varying periods of white contact have reinforced existing gaps between north and south Togoland, differences which are not political in nature.

According to the Constitution of 1946 and new trusteeship agreements concluded on

December 13 of that year, French Togoland-ers were permitted the same rights and privileges as peoples living in other parts of the French Union. The new "citizens" were asked to form a territorial assembly and to vote for representatives to the newly formed National Assembly of the French Union meeting in Versailles.

Political movements, local associations, trade unions and political parties soon came into being. Models were soon found in the political institutions and party system of the French State. Political parties, or branches of them, found in France or France Overseas, became quickly established in Togo. "Nationalist" movements and independence groups were soon formed of those who were anti-colonial and anti-French, with the possibility of "independence" from France (the alternative of "self-rule" within a French framework was not overlooked) to be attained as a part of a process of political evolution.

The parties put into sharp relief the ethnic groups and political problems of that time. Political associations lined up according to their stand on the Togo issue between the Unificationists and the Unionists.

The *Unificationists* were those who wanted the Ewé to be either united with the Gold Coast or in a separate Ewé state. Unification was desired to prevent the incorporation of French Togoland into the French Overseas Union.

There were five opposing "Unificationist" groups each working toward the same goal but presenting a different emphasis. Leaders of four "Unificationist" associations were Ewé both in Togoland and the Gold Coast, while one was from a northern Togo association. These "Unificationist" parties were: the All-Ewé Congress of the Gold Coast, Togoland Congress of Southern British Togoland, Togoland Youth Movement of Southern French Togoland, Committee of Togo-land Unity and the Popular Togolese Movement, the last three all from the French Togoland. These were all Ewé political associations.

By 1952, Sylvanus Olympio was stressing Togo unification rather than Ewé unification as a new approach to an old problem. This approach focused attention on Togo

national interests rather than the Ewé ethnic interests and attracted other ethnic elements who rightfully feared domination by the Ewé.

The *Unionists* received strength from two northern parties: the Progressive Togolese party and the Union of North-Togo Chiefs who were opposed to the Unification movement and desired continuous relationship with the French Union. The P.T.P. party was composed of Ewé *fonctionnaires* living in the North who had everything to gain in continuing their profitable association with France. The U.C.P.N. consisted of traditional chiefs who feared the Ewé were willing to continue association with France. Unionists received all the support the administration could give them in various elections held between 1950 and 1956. In 1950 they were a minority group, by 1955 the pro-French unionists completely controlled the seats in local and metropolitan assemblies. They unanimously demanded the end of the U. N. Trusteeship and the establishment of a statute of "self-government," as well as the maintenance of certain ties with the French Union.

In 1949, the nationalists—anti-French unificationists—held control of the various assemblies and were demanding complete autonomy and separation from the French Union. Such was the nature of the political "competition" and change of complexion in about six years. Six years later they were thoroughly defeated.

The referendum of October 28, 1956, was a decisive defeat for the nationalist groups headed by Sylvanus Olympio and victory for pro-French parties. Help has come indirectly to Olympio through the guise of the Trusteeship committee of the United Nations which does not recognize the legality of the referendum. Support is mainly from the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations.

Concerning the future one should not consider Togo nationalism a dead issue. At present the odds simply do not favor an early victory.

French Cameroon

An African was recently asked to locate

the French Cameroon. He answered: "Consider Africa as a revolver gripped in the right hand: French Cameroon is the trigger." Political events in the Cameroon are building with such speed and intensity one cannot but wonder if there was not more than the *location* of the Cameroon involved in the simile.

As was indicated earlier in this article, Togoland and the Cameroon have had almost parallel histories. On December 23, 1956, scarcely 75 years after the first treaty was signed, the people of the Cameroon voted whether to continue as they were or whether the *loi cadre* should be a basis for a new "self-determining" government in free association with France. The territory had, in the mind of the French administration, progressed sufficiently in her economic, social, educational and political development, and was considered ready for such a step. (Particularly bear in mind that the outcome of such an election could be foretold.) As in the case of other Overseas Territories France put her resources at the disposal of the Cameroon through the two agencies: the Central Fund for France Overseas and FIDES.

Metropolitan France from 1947 to 1955 granted \$162 million for the economic and social development of the Cameroon of which \$86 million is in subsidies and \$76 million in long term loans at low interest rates. In 1949, the Crédit du Cameroun granted \$8.5 million in loans, about 87 per cent to natives, through various agencies.

Of the 71,284,000 acres of productive land all but 247,000 is owned by various native groups, mostly in the south and central areas. Food crops such as cassava, corn, yams, plantain and bananas are grown primarily in the rain forests of the south while millets, peanuts and rice are grown principally in the central region. Cash crops, for export, include cocoa (56,000 tons, grade C), coffee (14,000 tons), bananas (76,000 tons) and various smaller crops such as palm oil, rubber, cotton and tobacco.

Livestock industry is beginning, with quick-freezing and processing plants in central and northern Cameroon. Rare woods from the seemingly unlimited forest resources are cut for export.

Industry is beginning in and near Douala,

the principal port city. A plant for processing bauxite, the largest in Africa, has been in operation for about a year in Edea on the Sanaga River. Paper mills, cigarette factories, breweries, oil depots and cold storage plants complete the industrial picture.

In 1955, the balance of trade showed imports valued at \$103.7 million (\$91.7 million in 1951) and exports valued at \$93 million (\$65.1 million in 1951), indicating at that time a favorable trade balance.

Soon after the constitutional reforms of 1946 the voting population of the Cameroon was asked to elect a Territory Assembly (A.T.C.A.M.) and to select representatives to the French Union, National Assembly and Council of the Republic meeting in or near Paris. Although not French nationals, the Cameroonians were considered citizens of the French Union. Since the December 23, 1956, elections they have been called Cameroonian citizens.

As in the Togoland "independence" movements, political parties, "tribal" associations and politically oriented trade unions soon came into being, using for their models political institutions found in the French Union. These varying movements reflect their ethnic origins and focus. Through them ethnic groups have found a legitimate means to express and reinforce their particular interests.

Divergent Ethnic Groups

Unlike Togo only one major tribe was bifurcated in the Cameroon, the Bamiliké living in the West Central area bordering British Cameroon. There was no crisis as with the Ewé. As in Togo, northern tribes remain traditionally oriented, almost feudal in character, with strong, centralized administrative organizations and authority allocated to a "chief."

Ethnic groups such as the Fulani, Bamun, Musgum (a Kirdi, or pagan group), and probably the Gbaya, Kaka and Massa are so organized. For the most part they fear the southern ethnic groups; they have had less white contact, less education and fear southern domination.

These groups belong to two political parties both of which support French policy

and want to continue relationships with France. The political parties of this area are the Cameroon Union (U.P.) of North Cameroon (supported by the Fulani, Bamun and a few other groups) which enjoys a majority in the new Legislative Assembly (A.L.C.A.M.) and the Independent Peasants (I) party of the Bamiliké tribe.

Ethnic groups in southern Cameroon such as the Douala, Bassa and Bulu have a very loosely organized political and social system. In no sense is there tribal unity. The village, a patrilineal kinship group, is the largest unified social component. Authority is delegated to village household heads who together form a council of elders.

It was to these groups that white culture first came. The city of Douala has now become the center of a very urban Cameroonian élite group, who over a long period of Western-type education have assimilated Western social and political ideas and ideals. One of these is nationalism, functionally a mixture of American and European ideologies.

Southern Cameroon supports two legitimate political parties and one illegal political movement. One legitimate party, the Cameroon Democrats (G.D.C.) is pro-French and receives support from the Roman Catholic church. The Cameroon Democrats want to continue a cooperative relationship with France over a long period of time. Support comes from native Catholics of many tribes.

The National Action (A.N.) party is an opposition, nationalist party. Although recognizing its cultural debt to France, this nationalist party (the only legitimate one), wants an eventual but clear break with France. It supports Cameroonian independence. Support for this party comes largely from Protestant elements in the Douala, Bassa and particularly the Bulu tribe. Assalé Charles, the president of the party, is a Bulu. He recently led a delegation of Cameroonian petitioners to the United Nations.

The U.P.C.

The once nationalist party, the Union of Cameroonian Populations (U.P.C.), banned

after the riots of May, 1955, receives most of its support from the Bassa ethnic group, although it has claimed territorial support. Now an "underground" movement, it asks for immediate separation from France, amnesty to political prisoners, free elections and the unification of the two Cameroons to form the Kamerun.

A review of recent political events, from May, 1955, will show the interrelationships of all of these parties and the French administration in the struggle for political control.

The U.P.C. as a political party was banned in July, 1956. Some of the leaders in the Douala riot in May, 1955, were put in jail; other leaders fled to British Cameroon where they led their movement from that place until June, 1957, when they were expelled.

During 1956, the French created a party, the Social Evolution of Cameroon (E.S.O.C.A.M.), by recruiting members from trade unions to combat the nationalist movement. In the meantime the National Action party was gaining strength because of the U.P.C. ban, and because the Douala ethnic association decided to support the National Action party instead of E.S.O.C.A.M. The combination of the Bulu and the Douala also represented a switch from the Left wing to the Right wing element of the nationalist movement because of their position (differing from Nyobé and the U.P.C.) in the December, 1956, election. The National Action group wanted to contest the election rather than to boycott it as the U.P.C. planned.

Um Nyobé asked the people of the Cameroon to abstain from voting unless certain conditions were first met by the French government: amnesty to political prisoners; reinstatement of the U.P.C. as a legitimate party, and so forth. These were published in both local and metropolitan papers (*Le Monde*, December 9, 1956, p. 12). The conditions were not met. At this time Nyobé did not yet know that he lacked the support of the Bulu and Douala groups.

On December 18, nine days after the conditions were announced, a "rebellion" broke out in the Bassa ethnic area (located between Douala and Yaoundé, the capital). Except for a minor U.P.C. demonstration in a Bamiliké village, the U.P.C. were alone in the insurrection.

Nyobé and/or his organizers (who may have been Red trained) had more than boycott in mind. It had been decided physically to prevent voters from going to the polls, hoping in this way to defeat the election.

During the following 24 hours—December 18-19—an engine was derailed just after it had crossed a narrow gorge; iron railroad ties were ripped up and thrown into a river; telegraph lines connecting Douala with Yaoundé were cut at 50 foot intervals, over a distance of about a mile; a bridge was burnt; road blocks and barricades were erected at every cross road leading from the Bassa area; gullies were dug across roads to a depth of ten feet. During the same night a number of white men driving in the area on personal business were man-handled and had their cars overturned.

White troops were brought from Douala by rail and guards were placed at bridge crossings, telegraph points and other important installations of the area. Troops were parachuted into Edea and Eseka to protect industrial plants and the hydroelectric dam. Soldiers destroyed the U.P.C. headquarters in Edea. Side arms were carried by the whites in the area.

On the evening of December 23, U.P.C.ists started to burn polling places in various Bassa "cantons." Non-U.P.C. Bassa who had come to vote had their houses burned by the U.P.C. Chiefs who tried to establish calm had their cars burned for their efforts. On the same night two candidates of the Cameroon Democrat Party (G.D.C.), Dr. Dalangué and Npuma, were assassinated as they encouraged the members of their party to vote despite the U.P.C. threat. The rift here is deeper than politics. The majority of the Bassa are Protestants, converted to Christianity, first by the German Basel mission, then, following the First World War, by fundamentalist American Presbyterians. Catholicism came late and there have been tensions and clashes, often between members of the same village family, on religious differences. These differences were brought to a head that night. It is interesting to note that the nationalist movement is basically "protestant."

Retaliation began the next day. U.P.C. houses were burned and members beaten.

Soldiers were given instructions to search out U.P.C. men and to shoot to kill. Any one moving became a legitimate target. Old grudges and animosities were remembered and revived. It was Bassa against Bassa. Thousands of women and children fled to the hills in western Bassaland. Estimates vary on the number killed and no authoritative figures have yet been published. It has been speculated that no fewer than 100 and probably no more than 2,000 Bassa were shot between December and the first of March, 1957, by soldiers alone.

In June, 1957, the government of the British Cameroon expelled the 11 U.P.C. leaders who had fled there for asylum some months before. Asylum would continue if they would agree to give up all political activity. This they refused to do and they fled to the protection offered them by Sudan and Egypt. Nyobé alone returned to the Cameroon.

There seems to be a recent trend for some U.P.C. party members to repudiate their leaders, perhaps shifting emphasis from an extreme Leftist organization to a center party, although with independence aspirations. This may be an attempt to have the U.P.C. become a legitimate party once more. This is not likely to happen, however, not because of supposed U.P.C. Communist leanings but because the U.P.C. would compete with the National Action group, which seems to be gaining strength as a nationalist and an opposition party. Politically speaking, at present the National Action group is in the minority.

An American national news magazine (*Time*, December 2, 1957,) published an article which leaves one with the impression that the U.P.C. is a group of hard-core Communists fighting guerrilla warfare, frightening local populations by burning, sacking and pillaging. This may be true of 100 or so but certainly not of 5,000, nor of the many U.P.C. sympathizers in southern Cameroon. Nor were the recent United Nations petitioners led by a Communist of the U.P.C. party. The group was led by Assalé and Priso of the National Action party. The

article was distorted.

There is little evidence revealing the U.P.C. as a Communist organization. Nyobé himself, on a number of occasions, has denied being a Communist. This does not atone for his barbarous policy, sacking, burning and murdering of last December. On November 20, 1957, soldiers were sent once more into the Bassa area to clean out U.P.C. party members. The results of this action are not yet known.

Self-Rule or Independence?

It will take a very strong man—one who has to put "national" interests above ethnic interests—to lead both Togo and Cameroon through the present crisis in the nationalist cause. "Neo-tribalism," putting "tribe" above country, is the main weakness of the nationalist movement in both territories. Should independence be granted there is fear that the two countries would be reduced to inter-group bickering and possible bloodshed, a return to a tribal state.

A strong man and a strong party must genuinely have territorial interests at heart and the cooperation of all of the ethnic groups desiring national unity. It is not popular to take the position that independence would defeat nationalist aspirations and that "self-rule," within the French framework, might lead to a united independence in the very near future.

Both territories have the support of the Asian-African bloc. Until now, the United States has not supported either one before the United Nations, and American support is crucial.

The Russians are obviously interested in this area. Like many other emerging groups, these peoples will certainly swing to any group who actively supports them both morally and materially. The twentieth century African is claiming the attention of the world not politely but urgently. Can the Western world afford to lose the support of thousands of Africans if these emerging peoples turn toward the East for tomorrow's economic progress and political future?

Producing, processing and selling food is by far our country's largest industry.

In French West Africa, "separation from France is not an important issue," writes this specialist. "The real issue has been the form to be taken by the union with France."

French West Africa

BY CARROLL QUIGLEY

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FOR the average American the words "French colonial policy" conjure up a confused vision of guerrilla warfare, economic exploitation, political paralysis, resentful native nationalism, and subversive Communist penetration. Whatever may be the truth or falseness of this picture in reference to Indo-China or Algeria, it is totally inapplicable to French West Africa.

In this happier portion of the globe, twenty million natives inhabiting an area three-fifths the size of the United States have found French colonial policy to be generous and imaginative. In the 15 years since French West Africa was "liberated" by Anglo-American forces, French economic aid has spurred an unprecedented economic "boom," while political rights have been granted to the natives faster than they have asked for them.

The consequence of this policy was seen in the territorial elections of March 31, 1957, the first held under universal suffrage. In

these elections the pro-French parties won decisive, in some areas overwhelming, victories over other parties which were generally only slightly less pro-French in their platforms. The policies which produced such a result are of interest not only to students of France or of Africa but to all those concerned with current world problems.

French West Africa, known officially as A.O.F. (*Afrique Occidentale Française*), occupies the southern and central portions of the great bulge of west Africa. Its 1.8 million square miles form a federation of eight territories whose federal capital is at Dakar. The size, population and local capital of each territory can be seen from the table on the opposite page (population in 1955 estimates).

Although French West Africa extends over 22° of latitude and 33° of longitude, most of its area is in the less accessible interior. Much of the coastline, including the better ports and the mouths of the more important rivers, is not possessed by France. These foreign enclaves, pinned to the coast by surrounding French territory, include areas controlled by Spain, Portugal and Britain and the two independent states of Liberia and Ghana. The coastline left in French hands consists, to a large extent, of swamps and mangrove thickets on the southern shore and sand bars harassed by crashing surf on the western shore.

The best natural port of A. O. F. is Dakar at the west-most point of the bulge of Africa. In the interior the chief commercial water ways are the Senegal River and the Niger (which reaches the sea in British territory), but the value of these is much reduced by

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seasonal rainfall which offers flooding rapids in summer and shifting sandbars in winter.

The rainfall generally diminishes from south to north in West Africa. In the south, where it falls throughout the year, it supports evergreen jungle. Further north, where it falls only in summer, it supports savannah parklands whose trees drop their leaves in winter. Continuing northward, as the dry season lengthens and the rainfall finally be-

whites brought the ravages of slave-hunting and ultimately the imposed peace and order of European domination.

But well into the twentieth century the peasant villages of Black Africa retained their local diversity, their solid foundation of status and custom, and their relative self-sufficient economic life. One of the consequences of this way of life is that even today the people of French West Africa

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Capital City</i>
Mauritania	416,108	546,000	Saint-Louis
Senegal	81,060	2,092,000	Saint-Louis
Guinea	108,466	2,257,000	Conakry
Ivory Coast	123,134	2,169,000	Abidjan
Dahomey	44,776	1,570,000	Porto-Novo
Sudan	461,270	3,445,000	Bamako
Upper Volta	105,764	3,116,000	Ouagadougou
Niger	493,694	2,165,000	Niamey
A. O. F.	1,834,272	17,360,000	Dakar

comes uncertain or lacking, grassy savannah gradually gives way to the Sahara Desert.

The people of this area, largely negroid, lived for centuries in tribes and family units which functioned as groups, cultivating in common the soil to which they were linked by elaborate religious and social bonds. In these groups, roles and status were bound by custom into a mutually satisfying nexus in which women and children, as well as men, had important functions and were, thus, esteemed and self-respecting.

The whole was tied together by animistic and polytheistic religious ideas closely related to the earth and with complex magical and ceremonial elements. The essential feature of the system was its sense of community, emphasized by the fact that an individual could assure his future by cooperating with the system, not by resisting or changing it nor by competition with his fellows.

Over the centuries this system has retained its chief features of diverse local customs even under the impact of powerful outside influences. Berbers and Arabs from the north brought to the area grassland pastoralism and, later, Muslim monotheism; European

speak over 100 different languages and can often communicate with each other only in French.

At the present time, these local peasant cultures along with the pastoralism of the northern grasslands are being completely transformed by European influences, above all by commercialism, European ideas and modern technology. Commercialism with price relationships is replacing customary economic and social relationships. European ideas are replacing such traditional loyalties as the family, and traditional authorities like chiefs and witch-doctors.

European urgency and its hectic sense of time are destroying the older, timeless and ceremonious way of life, while European technology has brought greater mobility, speedy communication and increased production. These forces began to work more than a generation ago, but have been much accelerated in the last 15 years. In this decade and a half the disruptions of World War II have been followed by the corrosive intrusion of new ideas and by the stimulation of high world prices for such West African

products as cocoa, cotton, vegetable oils and minerals.

Economic Changes

Before the liberation of France itself in 1944, plans were made for building up the economic and social foundations of France Overseas. In the ten years, 1948-1958, FIDES has made a direct public investment of almost two billion dollars. Almost a fifth of this has gone to French West Africa. At the same time, private investment has been encouraged by a number of financial, fiscal and commercial regulations. The West African franc was made freely convertible with the metropolitan franc but was worth twice as much. This exchange was kept stable by stabilization funds which maintained the value of the African franc.

Certain African products, such as peanuts or cocoa, were kept at artificial prices above the world price level to encourage production. Tax rates in Africa were considerably lower than in France itself, and new industries were generally made tax-exempt for the first five years. The French home market was reserved for some African products by tariff differentials. As a consequence of such encouragement, it was officially estimated that every franc invested in Africa from metropolitan France stimulates a local African investment 2.2 times as large.

Much of this investment, especially under the first plan (1948-1953), went into transportation. Nevertheless, transportation remains costly and burdensome. Strangely enough, this has favorably influenced the growth of processing industries and thus has tended to free West Africa, to some extent, from the old colonial bondage of exchanging raw materials exported at low prices for processed goods imported at relatively high prices.

In French West Africa five seaports (Dakar, Abidjan, Conakry, Cotonou and Kaolack) handle 95 per cent of the area's foreign traffic. Three-quarters of this freight comes to these ports by rail. Although the railways have been extended and considerably rebuilt in the last ten years and are constantly being supplemented by truck and air traffic, transportation costs remain very

high. Imported goods cost 50-80 per cent more at Bamako on the Niger River than at their port of entry at Dakar, while local products at Bamako are worth up to 60 per cent less than they are in Dakar.

Unlike the neighboring British areas where processing of African products has been discouraged or outlawed, the French have encouraged processing to reduce transportation costs. This has led to a rapid growth of such activities as shelling and processing peanuts, ginning and manufacturing cotton, the processing of hides, and the local production of building materials. Senegal has become the world's second greatest peanut producing area. There were in Dakar in 1955, 13 peanut processing factories, some with refineries and soap works, 14 textile mills, and 17 saw mills using local timber. Across the bay a Bata shoe factory was producing 1.3 million shoes a year from local hides.

From Dakar's 35 piers, 3.5 million tons of freight are handled each year. From its airport, only 1600 miles from Brazil, 17 air lines of nine nations carry more passengers than any other airport in Overseas France. Around this core of economic activity a large assortment of other enterprises has collected including 21 building-material factories, several large cement mills, and 17 movie houses.

As a result of such attractions as these, Dakar's population increased from 132,000 in 1945 to 171,000 in 1950, and is over 300,000 today. On a lesser scale, this pattern has been repeated in other places. Abidjan, the port of Ivory Coast, did not exist at all in 1933 and had no adequate harbor until 1951; its population was 46,000 in 1945 and must be twice that now. In the five years 1949-1954 the physical volume of exports from A.O.F. to non-French destinations increased 126 per cent, while the volume of imports from the same areas in the same period rose 79 per cent. In four years (1951-1955) freight exported from Conakry increased from 250,000 to 1,520,000 tons.

Generally speaking, agricultural research has sought new methods which could be fitted into the existing patterns of peasant farming. In a few areas, large mechanical plantations have been introduced, but the

most helpful large projects have been established as local variants on the American T.V.A. At Richard-Toll, near the mouth of the Senegal River, a combination irrigation-hydroelectric-navigation project is already well established. It will, when completed, provide a million acres of irrigated land for rice and cotton culture and a quantity of electric power. Ocean-size vessels will be able to go twice as far up the river, and importing 60,000 tons of rice a year will no longer be necessary.

An older and less unified development of the Niger River has been going on under the *Office du Niger* since 1932. Its chief activity has been around Sansanding, where the rainy season floods 40,000 square miles and has formed a bed of sediment several feet above the neighboring terrain. Here multiple purpose dams and canals have already reclaimed about a third of a two million acre project. By 1952 over 21,000 farmers had been settled on these new lands. Each settler on arrival was given a hut, land, three head of cattle, a plow and a well. With irrigation, some of these families have made a net profit of 300,000 to 400,000 African francs (roughly \$2,000) a year, an amazing rise in living standards.

New agricultural knowledge has been spread by all the well-known methods. In addition, *Sociétés de prévoyance* with compulsory membership were established in many areas after 1915. Supported by a poll tax of about seven francs a year, these organizations supplied their members with seed, information, agricultural credit and local transport. On occasion they built dams or wells and handled sales of produce. Since 1947, they have been replaced by more democratic and less official mutual co-operatives which concentrate on joint marketing arrangements. There are now many hundreds of these new groups. They work closely with various commodity price stabilization funds created since 1954. These funds finance their operations by borrowing from the National Equalization Fund set up in Paris in February, 1955 (capital 5,750 million francs).

The chief economic weakness of French West Africa, besides the chronic need for improved transportation, is the high cost of

power. Coal and petroleum are lacking; hydroelectricity is expensive. In 1954 and 1955 almost 20 million francs were spent on petroleum reconnaissance in the Sahara. This was so successful that, in December, 1956, the chief native politician of West Africa, Dr. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, introduced a bill in Paris to create a single administrative unit for the economic exploitation of the Sahara.

Known as *Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes*, this unit includes parts of Morocco, Tunis, Algeria, French Sudan, Niger and Chad. Already jeopardized by the political unrest in Algeria, Tunis and Morocco, the costs of exploiting this project are almost prohibitive.

The crying economic need for A.O.F., as for many other parts of the world, is a cheap method for the direct use of sunlight as a source of power. America's best contribution to the defeat of communism as an economic and social threat would be to provide the world with an efficient method for doing this. Nowhere would this invention be more helpful than in West Africa, where sunlight is the greatest unexploited natural resource.

In recent years valuable mineral deposits have been found in A.O.F. In Mauritania there are copper reserves of 27 million tons and iron reserves of 100 million tons (of 65 per cent ore). The copper is now being exploited by a company with 800 million francs of capital and should eventually produce 20,000 tons of copper a year. The iron is being developed by a Franco-British firm with 750 million francs of capital and should, in time, yield 4 million tons of ore comparable to the best Swedish quality.

In Sudan there are manganese reserves of 10 million tons of 50 per cent ore. In French Guinea, near Conakry, a subsidiary of the Aluminium Company of Canada has been operating since 1952, exporting to Canada about 450,000 tons of alumina a year. Two other enterprises in Guinea, near the Konkouré River, are investing 75 billion francs to exploit bauxite reserves which total 500 million tons. The alumina output here could be reduced locally to aluminium, as the Konkouré River has hydroelectric sites with a potential of five billion kilowatt hours, but the necessary

plants would cost a fantastic sum.

The recent increases in production in French Africa have provided rising standards of living for the area. An official estimate of 1956 fixed this rise at 68 per cent in the period 1947-1953. In 1953-1955 some of this was distributed to consumers in Africa by lowering costs of transportation, electric power, some consumers' goods and indirect taxes, at the very time that prices of African products were being raised in France.

In a speech at Princeton on October 15, 1957, Pierre Moussa, Director of Economic Affairs and Planning to the Ministry of Overseas France, stated that the gross national product of French Black Africa (A.O.F., A.E.F. and the Cameroons) rose 115 per cent in the nine years 1947-1956. This would represent an increase from 231 billion to 497 billion African francs of constant value.

Social Changes

The rapid economic growth of French West Africa has created difficult social problems. Urbanization and the commercialization of human relationships have torn individuals from their tribes, their families and their home villages. As the old authorities have lost influence, individualism has grown. The process has been exhilarating, but, at the same time, frightening, for freedom has brought economic insecurity. The satisfying cooperative life of the village is being exchanged for the lonely competitive life of the towns.

The most obvious consequences of this have been a great expansion of material desires, a proliferation of new artificial social groups, a weakening of family and tribal discipline and a considerable disruption of sexual morality. In the old days, village marriages were arranged by the families, sealed by inter-family economic payments, and made solid by the fact that agricultural life made wives and children economic assets to their men. The movement of younger men to the towns has meant too few young women in the towns and too few young men in the villages.

Sexual relations in the towns are far from family control; the scarcity of women gives

them a higher sexual value at the same time that the commercialization of life gives them a lower social and economic value to men; and marriage and children bring economic burdens, without equal economic or social gains. As a result, there has been a great increase in prostitution, concubinage, broken marriages and illegitimacy. A growing demand for material objects (a bicycle, a sewing machine, a phonograph or radio) has been accompanied by a declining respect for spiritual or social values.

Of course there are exceptions to all of this. Many urbanized Africans keep close family or village connections, welcoming fellow villagers on their first arrival in town and keeping their family links as a kind of social insurance to be used in time of sickness or unemployment. Many Africans seek educational advancement and other kinds of self-improvement.

French policy has tried to cope with these rapid social changes in West Africa by providing free association, social security and the right to self-respect. A law of August, 1944, granted freedom to associate in labor unions and another of the same month set up a corps of labor inspectors to protect working conditions. Eight years later, after long study and in close collaboration with native political leaders, the National Assembly in Paris, by unanimous vote, passed an elaborate Labor Code of 241 articles.

This code guaranteed the right to unionize, to bargain collectively, or to strike; outlawed all forced labor or peonage; provided for a 40-hour week and paid vacations; required adequate moving expenses, food and housing for migrant workers; and contained detailed regulations for night work and weekly rest. Most important of all, perhaps, it required equal pay for equal work without regard to racial origin, sex, age or legal status.

Subsequent legislation has made provision for accidents, health insurance and social security, has provided protection for pregnant women or working mothers, and has enacted into law the provisions of various international conventions seeking to protect working women or children. Of very great significance has been a recent law which requires that natives must be addressed with

the respectful form of the second person pronoun "vous," the more informal "tu," hitherto used by Europeans when speaking to natives, being left, as previously, for intimate friends, children, and animals.

While social respect can hardly be legislated, this law, more than any other, has shown the Africans where the government stands on the issue of racial equality and has made it clear that lapses in respect are individual failures officially disapproved.

Political Developments

French political reforms in the last 15 years have pointed clearly toward equality and self-government. For a long time, French colonial policy was authoritarian, centralizing and assimilationist. Since 1944, it has become democratic and federalist, while remaining assimilationist. The key point has been the continued emphasis on cultural assimilation.

Before 1940, the natives had a separate law and status, lacking citizenship or political rights, and subject to administrative procedures under semi-military rule. But this system was never based on racism; it rested on the fact that they lacked French culture. Such culture, it was assumed, had to precede political rights, legal equality or judicial unity. Even before 1940, natives who wished to make the great effort could obtain French culture, education and property, and, ultimately, through a legal process resembling naturalization, could obtain the legal equality and political rights of a French citizen in Africa.

The basic principles of French colonial policy have contrasted sharply with those of British colonial policy, at least in West Africa. Where the French aim has been to incorporate the native into French culture, or at the barest minimum give him the French language, the British aim has been to bring the native under the "rule of law," or at the barest minimum give him the English judicial system. The French have sought to rule with the collaboration of the élite minority which accepted French culture; while the British sought to rule in collaboration with the chiefs and existing tribal structures within the native culture.

Finally, the French tradition of political centralization led to a willingness to allow the African élite to participate in the central political organs of metropolitan France. The British, on the other hand, emphasized local autonomy from an early period and respected native culture and "minority" rights to a degree where political separation became an inevitable terminus.

Under the French Constitution of 1946, West Africa won the right to elect 20 deputies to the National Assembly, 20 senators to the Council of the Republic, and 27 members to the Assembly of the French Union. At the same time each of the eight territories of A.O.F. was given a territorial assembly of from 24 to 60 members, while the whole area obtained a federal *Grand Conseil* of 40 members (five from each territory). These chambers had considerable powers over their local budgets, but little control over the executive power which rested in the hands of an appointive Governor General and High Commissioner of France in Dakar and his subordinate governors in each territory.

The constitutional reforms of 1946 provided, for the first time, that all Africans should be French citizens, but political privileges were granted in three gradations. The great mass of natives had almost no political function and remained under a semi-military administrative rule. Europeans and the few fully assimilated natives formed a "first college" with full electoral privileges, while semi-assimilated natives were admitted to a "second college" with a separate electoral roll.

Although the "first college" numbered only a small minority of the population it had reserved to it about a third of the seats of the Territorial Assemblies and of the African membership in the Senate in France. Seats to the National Assembly in France, to the Assembly of the French Union, and to the Grand Council of A.O.F. were chosen by a single combined electorate and thus usually went to Africans.

As a consequence of this, the native political leaders of French Black Africa are usually deeply involved in metropolitan political activities and frequently hold ministerial positions in France. As local poli-

tical autonomy has been extended to the towns and cities of Africa, the same individuals have frequently become local administrators, usually mayors.

Political parties have become increasingly important with the widening of the suffrage since 1946. All have roots in the new urban groups such as labor unions, youth groups, tribal associations, or various welfare and social uplift groups. Some of these parties are local, such as the Mauretanian Progressive Union, the Senegalese Popular Bloc, the Republican Party of Dahomey, or the Democratic Movement of Volta. The first three of these dominate their respective territories. Other parties, notably the African Socialist Movement, led by Lamine Gueye, which controls Niger, are local branches of French political parties.

The dominant political party of French West Africa, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (R.D.A.) was organized at Bamako in 1946 by an alliance of various local groups. By 1950, under the influence of its Secretary General, Gabriel D'Arboussier, it had moved dangerously close to the Communist party line, but it was soon recaptured by the leader of the Ivory Coast section, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Houphouët-Boigny, a wealthy landowner, medical doctor, and devoted defender of France's civilizing mission, began his political career by organizing the small farmers of his home territory. A highly cultured gentleman and shrewd politician with a streak of mysticism in his nature, Dr. Houphouët-Boigny made public declarations of his loyalty to France in the Togoland debate before the United Nations, January 7, 1957, and in an article in the July, 1957, issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

In opposition to the R.D.A., Léopold Sédar Senghor, leader of the Senegalese Democratic Bloc, has allied this local Socialist party with others to form a new party, the Convention Africain. Senghor is even more devoted to French culture than Houphouët-Boigny. A talented French poet, he was the first West African to become *professeur agrégé de l'université*.

Both of these men, as well as other prominent West African political leaders (such as Lamine Gueye, Fily Dabo Sissoko, or Hammadou Diko) have been members

of recent cabinets in France itself and have played significant roles in recent colonial legislation. There can be no doubt that leaders such as these are superior in energy, ability, political wisdom and general culture to the average deputy in metropolitan France.

The extension of political equality to French Africa continued from 1946 onward. The final and greatest step came with the "loi cadre" of June 23, 1956. This was put into effect by a series of decrees approved by the National Government in February, 1957. These decrees gave legislative powers to the territorial assemblies while reserving to France certain enumerated powers, of which the chief were foreign relations, political security, and defense. In addition each territory was given a cabinet of at least six ministers with a responsible leader but presided over by the French governor.

The Grand Council of West Africa, meeting at Dakar under the Governor General, was to act as a coordinating body among the territories and was given a special subcommittee to serve as an administrative court to settle disputes among them. Finally and above all, universal suffrage was granted to all citizens of both sexes in French Africa. In explaining these decrees to the press, on February 22, 1957, Premier Guy Mollet said that France intended to satisfy the political aspirations of native peoples before hostile nationalism developed.

The quinquennial general elections of March 31, 1957 (which had been preceded by African municipal elections on universal suffrage on November 18, 1956), were a complete justification of Mollet's policy. With 474 seats at stake in the eight territories, Houphouët-Boigny's R.D.A. won 236 seats in six territories including 57 out of 70 in Sudan, 56 out of 60 in Guinea, 37 out of 70 in Upper Volta, and all 60 in Ivory Coast. Gueye's African Socialist Movement took 62 seats, including 41 of 60 in Niger, while its affiliated Volta Democratic Movement took 26 of 70 in Upper Volta.

Senghor's African Convention took 59 seats including 48 out of 60 in Senegal. The Dahomey Republican Party took 35 of 60 seats in its territory, while in Mauritania all 34 seats went to the Mauritanian Progressive

Union whose chief aim is to resist Moroccan aspirations to absorb that territory. Thus a single party won a clear, generally overwhelming majority in each of the eight territories; none of these parties was even remotely anti-French; and the R.D.A., by controlling four of the assemblies, was able to get control of the Grand Council at Dakar.

The African Convention Party Congress at Dakar in January, 1957, the R.D.A. Party Congress at Bamako in September, 1957, and recent statements from West African political leaders make it perfectly clear that separation from France is not an important issue. It is generally agreed (1) that West Africa needs French economic aid, (2) that the twentieth century is the age of large political groups and not of small Balkanized independent states, (3) that freedom is more important than independence and by no means identical with it, and (4) that France still offers cultural growth for Africans.

The real issue has been the form to be taken by the union with France. Here there have been two principal points of view. Houphouët-Boigny has inclined toward a solution in which each territory would be joined in a federal union with France. Sédar Senghor has demanded that the eight territories be merged into a federated West Africa which could, in turn, be brought into a more nearly equalized federal structure with France. This view has been defended within the R.D.A. by Sékou Touré, the able, labor-unionist, leader of the Guinea branch of the party.

Houphouët-Boigny's lack of enthusiasm for a federated West Africa has several causes. As mayor of Abidjan and party leader of the Ivory Coast, as well as deputy in Paris, member of the French Cabinet, and French delegate to the United Nations, Houphouët-Boigny has found his energies well occupied on the territorial and metropolitan levels with little time for the third, middle, level of the A.O.F. federation. Some of his local followers have objected that a closer federation might force the affluent Ivory Coast to share its wealth with poorer territories. Some of his enemies have hinted that the learned doctor has been so dazzled by Paris as to forget his fellows in Africa.

There can be no doubt that Houphouët-

Boigny's popularity has risen so high in metropolitan France that this fact alone could threaten his popularity in Africa. The R.D.A. leader is fully aware of the danger of following in the path of Jan Smuts of South Africa, who gained the world but lost his homeland. At the Bamako Party Conference in September, 1957, Houphouët-Boigny was allowed to continue both as Minister Delegate in Paris and as President of the R.D.A., but was forced by Sékou Touré to accept a resolution for a federated A.O.F. with a federal executive at Dakar.

About the same time as the Bamako Conference, the Grand Council at Dakar unanimously asked for a federal executive. Although this would mean African control of the wide powers of the Governor General (and might end his veto power), it cannot be regarded as an anti-French demand. It is quite clear to the French and Africans that a West African federation with large autonomous powers is inevitable in the near future. It is equally clear that a constitutional revision of the French Union is also necessary to merge France and its overseas areas into a more viable political structure. And it is also obvious to all that the connection between France and the overseas areas, not inhabited by large blocks of Frenchmen, must be based on mutual need and a common appreciation of French culture rather than on force or rigorous constitutional provisions.

These changes are likely to come in the next year or two; they will crown developments which are reversing the relationship between metropolitan France and the overseas areas. A century ago it was said that centralization in France resulted in paralysis in the extremities and apoplexy at the center. Now that the French system has paralysis at the center and vitality at the extremities, centralization must be replaced by some kind of federalism. Possibly such a change can restore some vitality to the center.

These at least are the trend of developments and the hope of the future in French Black Africa. It is unfortunate that such trends and hopes in this area have been concealed by the uproar and hatreds arising from extremism on both sides in Indo-China and North Africa.

"The sleeping giant that is Madagascar has been awakened," writes this author. As he evaluates the problem, "Distance no longer makes it impractical for Madagascar to become a self-governing unit in the French Republic." He believes that "if France accepts seriously the principle of partnership as proposed in recent official pronouncements the road is reasonably clear ahead."

Madagascar: Sixty Years of French Control

BY LEVINUS K. PAINTER
Specialist in African Affairs

DURING the nineteenth century, Madagascar and Zanzibar played the part of minor pawns on the chess board of western empire builders. Finally, about 1880, Britain settled for Zanzibar as her sphere of influence and Madagascar was turned over to the maternal care of France. However, the island enjoyed virtual freedom for most of the century under the government of Malagasy rulers, most of them queens. It took France most of two decades to establish undisputed political authority over this sub-continent which is larger than the area of France and Belgium combined. There was no urgent reason to establish political control over a colonial area that was far away and offered no immediate hope of economic return.

Madagascar is well removed from the most travelled sea lanes and is off the intercontinental air routes. Aside from a small staff of Lutheran missionaries, few Americans have visited this fourth largest of the world's islands. Plant and animal life are quite different from those on the mainland, although separated by only 250 miles across the Straits of Madagascar. The people are predominantly Malay-Polynesian stock some-

what intermingled with African blood, particularly in the western highlands. A few former African slaves or their descendants may be seen on the streets of Tananarive, the capital. On the eastern and northeastern coast Arab influence has prevailed through many centuries and there has been some intermingling of racial strains. In more recent years, a few Indians and Chinese have added to the polyglot population of coastal cities.

The Malagasy language was not reduced to written form until after the coming of English missionaries in 1818, so there is no authentic record of how these brown people navigated the waters of the Indian ocean, perhaps with the aid of trade winds, and found for themselves a new home on the mountain ribbed island of Madagascar. The wide variation of racial types among the existing groups or tribes is quite certain evidence of several migrations from different areas and probably at widely separated intervals. No traces remain of the previous inhabitants, supposedly people of small stature and chocolate in color.

The Hova Rulers

The Hova group who became rulers during most of the nineteenth century are judged to be comparatively late comers. The Bétésiléo in the south and the large Sakalava group in the western mountains seem to be more powerfully built and had the reputation for fierceness in battle. Yet, perhaps due to organizing and administrative ability, the Hova established their su-

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premacy. The hereditary chieftain, Radama I, consolidated the conquests of his father and gained control of the central part of the island about 1810. He opened the way to Western trade, education and culture.

Following his death in 1828 his daughter, Ranavalona I, took control of government. Within a few years she adopted a policy of isolation. Christians were persecuted, missionaries were driven out and foreign trade was discouraged. Following her death in 1861 her son Radama II came to power. He reversed his mother's policy and again opened Madagascar to Western influence and culture. However his career was brief. He was murdered two years later and his widow became Queen Rasherina. The prime minister under the former Queen regained power and stabilized his political position by marrying the Queen. As a matter of fact he had assured his security in the same way during the reign of the first Queen. The new Queen lived only five years. The prime minister became the consort of the third Queen, Ranavalona II. When she took over in 1868 she ordered the royal idols burned and, along with her husband the perennial prime minister, she was baptized and advised her subjects to attend the mission churches. Later a fourth Queen succeeded to the throne but French pressure was increasing. Military forces took control and she was forced into exile in 1896. Thus the glory of Malagasy Queens went into eclipse and a century of Malagasy independence became history.

During the century of virtual independence alternating British and French influence brought increasing trade, except for the period of isolation. Late in the century some exploration of mineral resources was undertaken. Simple home skills were developed. Education under missionary supervision was expanded. Slavery had been officially abolished in 1877 but as a matter of practice it did not end until the French assumed control in 1896.

The proud Hova people paid dearly for the superior culture and "know how" of the West. They became a subject people under a supposedly benevolent colonial system. New roads were built. The capital city, Tananarive, was modernized. More schools

and hospitals were established, often with the aid of missionary groups from France, England and America. Over five hundred miles of railroad were constructed connecting Tananarive with the coast and providing several spur lines, all in the east central part of the island.

It has been said that wherever the Germans went they built a fort; the first act of the British was to build a customs house; while the French are reputed to start colonial expansion with a transportation system. They did build many miles of all weather highways. However I observed an unusually large number of British Landrovers, perhaps indicative that during the rainy season four wheel drive motor vehicles are very useful on secondary highways. Life remains very primitive except in the seaport towns and in the central part of the island. In this area, there has been fair agricultural development and the country villages reflect a somewhat higher economic and cultural level. In most of these communities there is a church and an elementary school. About 40 cent of these schools are private and are supervised by mission groups.

In 1955, the population of Madagascar was about 4,800,000 and is increasing at the rate of about 100,000 per year. Tananarive, the capital, now has a population of over 180,000. About 47,000 French reside on the island with a small increase through immigration. Other racial groups account for 18,000 residents. Most of these people from Europe and Asia live in the larger cities.

Hospital, health and sanitary facilities are very good in the larger cities but in the remote mountain areas medical care is very limited or nonexistent. Some progress has been evident in recent years in the control of malaria but there is very apparent lack of quinine, quinidine or other preventative drugs. The present government has in its program plans for extended health and medical service.

On paper at least the government's program includes universal literacy education and in the cities this program is in operation. Children in Tananarive are well dressed, except in the slum area, and most of them are reported to be in school. The

education program includes higher education on the university level with schools of pharmacy and medicine and three schools of agriculture in the provinces. A rather rigid French curriculum prevails in the schools which is something of a hardship to British educators and would be more disturbing to American educators.

In theory the French colonial authorities claim to be adapting the educational system to Malagasy needs. In actual practice there is very limited evidence of much adaptation. There is no segregation as such in schools or social life. However, barriers of language and culture still keep the racial groups pretty well separated.

Geographical isolation tends to slow down development of an emerging Malagasy culture. It may be that the resultant culture will be more indigenous and, if so, this is an advantage. Modern air facilities make travel comparatively easy, six hours from Nairobi, Kenya and less than thirty hours from Paris. There are only occasional flights directly to the African mainland to the west.

Madagascar really deserves more tourists. The Malagasy culture, palace architecture, the scenery and most of all the people themselves make such a visit rewarding and memorable. My Malagasy host and his family in Tananarive did everything to make my visit profitable and enjoyable. However French residents in the city made some apologies for the limited facilities of their hotels. I was entertained in private homes and had no reason to make comment from experience.

Up to the present Madagascar has depended largely on agriculture to bolster her economy. However there is some processing of meats, fruits and other foodstuffs. The Malagasy are very adept at weaving, using silk, cotton and vegetable fibers. Also they are skilled in fine metal work in making jewelry and ornaments. Limited amounts of coffee, vanilla, processed foods and hides are exported. Gold, mica, graphite and other minerals add in small measure to the export volume. But at best imports exceed exports by about 50 per cent. There are extended coal reserves at Saloa in the southern part of the island but up to the present there is no production for export. There

are also known deposits of iron, copper, chromium, asbestos and bitumen but none has been mined on any considerable scale.

The Zoma or street market in Tananarive is a riot of color as viewed from one of the many stairway streets. Tropical and semi-tropical fruits, beautifully hand woven fabrics and many objects in metal of exquisite craftsmanship are offered for sale—wonderfully alluring to tourists, but there are no tourists. However such city markets provide a substantial medium of exchange.

The economy is closely connected with that of France. Capital and engineering skill as well as machinery and transportation will be needed to develop Madagascar's mineral wealth. France has not been able to provide the needed capital funds. Unstable financial conditions in France are quickly reflected on the island in rising cost of living and black market activities. Meanwhile the people in the less populous areas depend on agriculture and live on a mere subsistence level.

Traditional Malagasy religious faith centered in primitive forms of animism and ancestor worship. Their major concern in religious ceremonies was to ward off the evil spirits supposedly responsible for all the ills in family and national life. Early in the nineteenth century the London Missionary Society sent pioneer Christian leaders to Madagascar who began the slow process of creating a written language, establishing elementary schools and seeking converts to the Christian faith. Following three decades of persecution in the middle of the century the way was opened for the rapid expansion of Christianity. Most of the people in cities are allied to the Christian communities, Protestant or Catholic, and the central part of the island is predominantly Christian.

What of the Future?

Problems of colonialism in the twentieth century setting defy any simple proposed solutions. In fact no pattern of colonialism, however benevolent, is relevant as emerging peoples aspire to a new political, social and cultural status. Frequent changes in government and the consequent unstable foreign

policy have created many perplexing problems in French colonial areas. There is substantial evidence to the effect that conservative Malagasy political leaders are not urging that the island return to its nominal nineteenth century independence. Rather they are seeking full self-government within the framework of the French Republic. This also seems to be the policy within the central government in Paris. However implementation sometimes lags behind policy.

Malagasy political leaders are probably aware that under independent local self-government there would be more use of arbitrary power, more corruption, higher taxes, less education and possibly slowing down of industrial development. While they are willing to remain a part of the French Republic they want to control their own national destiny. A visit to the palace of the former rulers, now converted into a museum, is revealing. On visiting days thousands of Malagasy throng its halls, stand in quiet reverence before the paintings of Hova Queens and pay silent tribute to the departed glory of Madagascar. Unquestionably the traditions of the last century are still strong in the hearts of patriotic people.

In some measure French colonial officials are aware of the nationalistic aspirations of the Malagasy people. Following the Second World War an attempt was made to put into operation a more enlightened and democratic policy. An effort was made to revive the ancient "Fkonolona," (also spelled "Fokonolona") the natural Malagasy local political unit, as the medium through which more complete local self-government could be developed. But Malagasy political patterns had been distinctly paternal and autocratic and it has not been easy to develop truly democratic procedures.

Just at the time when the new attempts in the direction of self government were being projected an apparently unprovoked rebellion broke out in 1947. It seems strange that this uprising should take place just in the wake of granting greater liberties. Forced labor had been outlawed and justice in proper courts had been assured. Obviously the concessions were "too little and too late."

Unquestionably the internal instability of

France contributed substantially to the feeling of insecurity on the part of the Malagasy. France had been defeated and overrun by a foreign power. It was assumed that she had not sufficient military power to cope with rebellion. The self-appointed Malagasy leaders appealed to the less educated people in the hill country.

These people had nothing to lose economically or politically. Fifty years of French control had contributed little to the enrichment of their subsistence existence. Many soldiers recruited to help fight the battles of Europe had returned home disillusioned and were adrift with no social or economic ties. They were natural recruits in the new conflict.

But the rebellion faced insurmountable odds with little organization, few arms and no supplies. There could be only one possible outcome, failure and defeat. The leaders doubted the ability of France to provide a stable government on their remote island. They underrated the existing local military power. At the same time the more educated people in the cities refused to join in the rebellion.

According to reports, as many as 80,000 Malagasy tribesmen lost their lives in the revolt, largely because of disease, lack of food and exposure in the mountains. The two appointed representatives in the French Parliament were reported to be implicated in the revolt. Without what was considered a fair trial, judgment was pronounced and they paid with their lives. The revolt at last awakened French political leaders to the necessity for taking more specific moves in the direction of Malagasy self government.

When I was in Madagascar late in 1956 plans were under way to put into effect the framework for self-government as projected in Paris in June, 1956. The plan proposes gradual achievement of universal suffrage without racial discrimination. In January, 1957, the French National Assembly delegated to the Territorial Assembly limited powers of self-government in internal affairs. This Assembly is made up of 54 members, nine elected from each of the six provinces.

The Governor General is the appointed

representative of the French Republic in Madagascar. Under this plan each of the six Provinces has its own local Provincial Assembly with designated powers. As an integral part of the French Republic five Deputies and seven Senators are to be elected by popular vote to the French Parliament. Also the Provincial assemblies will elect seven Counselors to the Assembly of the French Union. The time schedule in putting this new political program into full operation will depend on many factors.

There is little evidence of resentment against Western culture in Madagascar. As a matter of fact the French have been accused of holding back educational, cultural and political development. French leaders have been quoted as saying rather regretfully, "They want our civilization but not from us. They do not want us any more."

To the casual observer the present French administration seems impersonal and quite inflexible. There seems to be all too little contact between French officials and the Malagasy people. Even without racial discrimination it is still difficult for the 65,000 people from overseas who have made Madagascar their home to enter into actual working partnership with approximately 5,000,000 Malagasy citizens. Language, cultural and economic barriers are not easily or quickly pushed aside even among people of goodwill.

The Malagasy people have had little training in democracy. Up to the present time they have been willing to accept a paternalistic system of social and political organization. In an earlier generation the Hova rulers had been more paternalistic and autocratic than the French officials of recent decades—and probably less just.

The French brought to the Malagasy people material benefits that the Hova Queens could not provide. Highways and motor vehicles have reduced the travel time from coastal ports to Tananarive in the highlands from days to hours. Airstrips and modern plane service have made them neighbors of peoples in distant lands. Foreign trade has brought many modern household conveniences to city dwelling Malagasy.

The Malagasy home in which I was entertained for several days has modern plumb-

ing—at least as modern as one might find in parts of Paris. Educated nationals do not intend to give up these marginal and material benefits of Western civilization. These people may be relatively few in number but they will provide most of the leadership for the immediate future.

Present day Malagasy society suffers the effects comparable to a split personality. At many points the new political patterns cut directly across old practices. This can best be illustrated by the ancient concepts of law. Malagasy laws were classed in two categories: first the "fomba" or ancient customs, and second, the "didy," the decrees handed down by rulers. Political paternalism carried over into home and family life.

The French colonizers wisely interfered as little as possible with the "fomba." But the folkways which served to stabilize the old social order did not fit into the new structure. As usually happens, the characteristics of the new and dominant culture tend to push aside the old patterns of living. Many Malagasy cling to the folkways of their ancestors yet at the same time they are eager for the apparent advantages brought by western culture. Government decrees may be accepted in normal times but should the rice crop fail government has become the new evil spirit plaguing life and security.

Educational Reform

A further word should be said regarding education. In Madagascar an educational system should be evolved that is more distinctly Malagasy and with less of the imprimatur of Paris upon it. But it is not enough to begin with the children. Comparable folk education of adults should parallel the training of youth. Otherwise the entire structure of family life is jeopardized. The lag in adult education is a serious handicap in any emerging culture. Very naturally, training in agriculture and in home crafts becomes a part of such a program. Likewise, education in sanitation, diet and health is essential in any adult program. The lack of a sufficient tax base is a perplexing factor in financing an expanding program of education. The only

answer is a program of economic development that will enable nationals to increase their earning power.

The sleeping giant that is Madagascar has been awakened. The Malagasy people aspire to become a part of the modern world. They live far out on the frontier but they cannot be ignored, they are people too. How can their genius and their social potential be mobilized in creating a new economic and political life? Whatever the future form of government, France has a major responsibility in helping answer this question. Non-governmental agencies are taking their full share of responsibility. Even people who take a dim view of the Christian Missionary enterprise must be aware that these statesmanlike pioneers have made a lasting contribution in the field of education, in providing medical and health care, and in undergirding the emerging culture with moral and spiritual qualities that give sustaining power in times of transition and political crisis. Missionaries arrived in Madagascar three quarters of a century before France finally established her claim on the island. Much of the education under control of Missions continues without government subsidy because of the difficulty of conforming to the rigid system of French education.

Colonialism has been the almost inevitable product of world expansion on the part of Western nations. Often economic factors have weighed more heavily than political considerations. When a dependency has become unprofitable financially the colonizing nation often finds it politically expedient to grant semi-independence or at least a self governing status. Without heavy investment of capital France cannot hope to make Madagascar an economic asset. Mineral resources and industrial potential remain undeveloped.

Distance no longer makes it impractical for Madagascar to become a self governing unit in the French Republic. It formerly took four times as long to come from the east coast to Tananarive, the capital, as it now takes to fly from Paris to Tananarive. Within modern times the people of Madagascar did govern themselves, granting it was not done too well judging by present day standards. It is quite remarkable that four of the rulers in the last century were Queens, a fact without parallel in ancient or modern history. Finally if France accepts seriously the principle of partnership as proposed in recent official pronouncements the road is reasonably clear ahead. At least the surveyor's stakes are set showing grades and curves. However the time schedule becomes a serious matter.

Recently on the East Africa mainland I had opportunity to observe a new stretch of black top road being built. Every stone in that three miles of new highway was broken by hand. Should the methods followed by those highways engineers be followed by Madagascar political leaders results could be nothing less than disastrous.

Nationals in many areas are reminding us, "Time is running out." Europeans may say, "These people are not ready." That is right, they are not ready and they never will be if they are not given a chance to help work out their own political destiny. They will have to get experience the hard way.

Many serious mistakes will be made. The people of Ghana are finding that the road of self government is no primrose path. It is possible that new nations will bring upon themselves economic ruin and political chaos. Yet it is also possible that they will succeed better than we think. During the past two years France has plotted her course in Madagascar. We can hope for some reasonable measure of fulfilment.

“... Sovereignty, as a matter of right, appertains to the Nation only, and not to any individual; and a Nation has at all times an inherent, indefeasible right to abolish any form of Government it finds inconvenient, and to establish such as accords with its interest, disposition, and happiness. The romantic and barbarous distinction of men into Kings and subjects, though it may suit the conditions of courtiers, cannot that of citizens; and is exploded by the principle upon which Governments are now founded.”

—Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man*, 1791-1792.

Noting that "France has created more than material gains in Equatorial Africa," this author declares that "France has awakened in some of what used to be the most backward peoples in the world a desire for self-government. . . ." In this author's opinion, "At the moment France still has the goodwill of the Africans." Consequently, "if France can adapt the structure of the French Union to permit gradual self-government for Equatorial Africa before that country is in a position to force self-government for itself, France may find Equatorial Africa willing to remain permanently within the French Union."

French Equatorial Africa

BY DAVID GARDINIER

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FRENCH Equatorial Africa has received important attention from France for the first time only in the past decade, and today is experiencing significant political and economic progress. Carved from the continent by the French during the late nineteenth century European race for African possessions, this elongated and irregularly-shaped country stretches inland from a 550-mile coast above the Congo estuary for 2000 miles in a north-east direction.

In the equatorial rainforest of the southern third, the savanna of the central portion, and the near-desert of the extreme north, a total area as large as the entire United States east of the Mississippi, there is a population only as large as Massachusetts', nine-tenths Negro, mainly Bantu-speaking, and one-third Muslim. A malarial climate and dense forest in the south and the location of three-quarters of the population over 600 miles from the sea in regions without navigable rivers leading seaward contribute to the country's backwardness.

Long neglected by most Frenchmen, themselves preoccupied with two world wars and a severe depression during much of this century, Equatorial Africa has acquired economic, strategic and prestige value in French eyes only during the past decade of national independence movements and of East-West struggle.

Administratively, France has divided Equatorial Africa into four territories which in 1956 had the following area and population:

	<i>Square Miles</i>	<i>Population</i>
Gabon	103,000	383,410
Middle Congo	132,000	746,193
Ubangi-Shari	238,000	1,119,959
Chad	496,000	2,519,853
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	969,000	4,769,415

As Overseas Territories of the French Union the four territories send seven representatives to the Assembly of the French Union, eight councillors to the Council of the Republic, and seven deputies (two for the 7500 French and five for the Africans) to the National Assembly.

Between 1946 and early 1957, the four territories formed the federation of Equatorial Africa. Laws implementing the French Constitution of 1946 set up in each of the four territories an elected deliberative assembly which gave advice on matters chiefly financial to the French-appointed governor of the territory. Each assembly chose five of its 37 to 50 members to sit in the *Grand Conseil*, the federation's 20-member deliberative assembly at Brazzaville. The *Grand Conseil* in turn gave advice on financial matters to the French-appointed Governor-General of the federation. The territorial assemblies, elected by separate French and African electoral colleges, had African majorities. Except for a gradual enlargement of the numbers eligible to vote, 800,000 by 1956, and the creation of a number of *communes mixtes* (municipalities electing part of their city council) and *communes de plein exercice* (cities electing

their whole city council and mayor), no important change in the administrative structure of the federation took place between 1947 and 1957.¹

Decrees of April 4, 1957, implementing the *Loi Cadre* of June 23, 1956, abolished the federation of Equatorial Africa for the time being at least, and placed a measure of political power in African hands for the first time not at the federation level, but at the territorial level. One decree gave each territorial assembly the power to pass its territorial budget and to levy taxes to make the budget balance. It also provided a number of other legislative powers as yet not clearly defined concerning financial and economic matters. A second decree gave each territorial assembly an opportunity to participate in the management of the administrative departments by altering the composition of the territorial governor's cabinet, the *Conseil de Gouvernement*.

In place of the civil servants who formerly composed each *Conseil de Gouvernement* now sit six to twelve ministers elected by the territorial assembly after the assembly elections. The territorial assembly may not remove the ministers during its term of office but they may resign if they feel they no longer have the territorial assembly's confidence. The ministers cooperate with the *head* of the territory, formerly called the governor, in the management of the various administrative departments and meet collectively to advise him.

France decided to grant real political power to the Africans first at the territorial level at the request of several African political parties that the creation of autonomous territories should precede the establishment of an autonomous federation of Equatorial Africa. It is not unlikely that at some time within the next few years France may restore the federation and grant powers to the *Grand Conseil* for the country as a whole similar to those recently granted to the territorial assemblies.

For the time being, however, France refers to the four territories of Equatorial Africa not as a federation but merely as a "group of territories." The Governor-General heads the administration of the group of territories and the *Grand Conseil* acts in an advisory capacity to coordinate matters concerning the four territories as a group.

Although the new reforms give Equatorial Africans some voice in their own government for the first time, a preponderance of political power remains in French hands. France has exclusive control over the country's diplomacy, defense, and police. The chief executive of the country as a whole, the Governor-General, and the chief executives of the territories, the heads, are French-appointed and are not responsible to the representatives elected by the Africans. The heads of territories preside over the territorial *Conseils de Gouvernement*. The Governor-General still supervises all aspects of the administration and convokes the two yearly sessions of the *Grand Conseil*. In 1957, apparent harmony existed between the Governor-General and the seven political parties in the *Grand Conseil*.

At present, the political parties, like the country itself, remain in a rudimentary state. Few of the political parties which competed in the territorial assembly elections in April, 1957, even existed five years ago. Only two of the sixteen African members of the *Grand Conseil* in 1957² were members in 1953. Because political parties first arose to elect candidates to the territorial assemblies, no party represented in the *Grand Conseil* exists in more than one of the four territories.

In both Ubangi-Shari and Chad only one African party controls all of the territorial assembly seats. At the federation level several parties have to form a bloc to run the *Grand Conseil*. In June, 1957, ten members from four parties affiliated with the West African majority party, the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*, organized the *Grand Conseil* and elected its officers.

Equatorial African parties have acquired loose ideological and organizational ties with West African parties through geographical proximity and contact in the French National Assembly. In 1957, the parties represented in the *Grand Conseil* were:

¹ Prior to the April, 1957, elections for the territorial assemblies, France instituted a single electoral roll and enlarged the size of each territorial assembly: Gabon, 37 to 40; Middle Congo, 37 to 45; Ubangi-Shari, 40 to 50; Chad, 50 to 65.

² The sixteen African members include seven clerks or government employees, three schoolteachers, two pharmacists, one physician, and a farmer (the president).

Party	Territory	Number of Seats	West African Party Affiliated With
Bloc Démocratique Gabonaise	Gabon	3	Houphouët-Boigny's <i>Rassemblement Démocratique Africain</i>
Union démocratique et socialiste gabon- aise	Gabon	2	Leopold Senghor's <i>Convention Af- ricaine</i>
Mouvement socialiste Africain	Middle Congo	3	Lamine Gueye's M.S.A.
Union démocratique de Défense des In- térêts Africains ³	Middle Congo	1	very recently R.D.A.; earlier opposed R.D.A. locally
Union du Moyen Congo	Middle Congo	1	R.D.A.; European party locally al- lied with U.D.D.I.A.
Mouvement d'évolu- tion sociale en Af- rique Noire	Ubangi- Shari	5	none; a mass-type party like Ghana's Convention People's Party
Entente Républicaine pour l'application de la <i>Loi Cadre</i> ⁴	Chad	5	R.D.A.; locally a coalition of former socialists, Gaullists, and others

None of the seven political parties represented in the Grand Conseil has denounced the 1957 reforms as insufficient as certain of the West African parties with which they are affiliated have done. Several parties were disappointed with the limited nature of the reforms, especially in view of the desire of roughly two-fifths of the French National Assembly, including the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*, the Communists, and African representatives of all parties, to grant even wider reforms.⁵ Nevertheless, all of the Equatorial African parties have expressed a willingness to work within the framework of the new reforms at least for the time being.

All the parties consider the 1957 reforms not as definitive but as the first of a series of reforms leading to self-government. No party advocates complete separation from France but all envisage eventual self-government, disagreeing on the speed with which it should come and the exact form it should take.

The U.D.S.G. (*Convention Africaine*) would like to see the abolition of the territories in Equatorial Africa and their replacement by a unitary state having a federal relationship with France. Some of the parties affiliated with the R.D.A. since Au-

gust, 1957, have favored essentially the same thing; while others hold to the earlier R.D.A. position that the creation of autonomous territories within the country of Equatorial Africa should precede the establishment of a federal state, federal in itself and federal in its relations with France.⁶

The M.S.A., which sees continued Eurafri- can economic ties as leading most rapidly to self-government, has not committed itself to any particular form of self-government. Grand Conseil President Barthélémy Boganda's M.E.S.A.N., a party of diverse ethnic, religious and ideological groups, has also not committed itself. A hard look at educational and economic conditions reveals to all the parties that despite significant advances in the past decade the country still lacks the conditions necessary for complete self-government.

In 1956, 171,000 of the estimated 700,000 children of primary school age (24.4 per cent) were attending school, compared to

³ U.D.D.I.A. is led by a Catholic priest, Abbé Fulbert Youlou, who is a traditional chief and the mayor of Brazzaville.

⁴ Details on the parties come from "*Le Grand Conseil, Actualités d'Afrique Noire*, Juillet, 1957, pp. 10-12.

⁵ See *The New York Times*, January 26, 1957, and February 3, 1957.

⁶ For details on the R.D.A.'s shift in position see the article "*Vers la création d'un exécutif Fédéral à Dakar?*" in *Le Monde*, September 13, 1957.

only 15,921 in 1945 and 108,788 in 1952. In Gabon and Middle Congo, 62.6 per cent of the children were attending school but only 7.2 per cent in Chad. In 1956, 1300 pupils were attending 23 primary teacher-training schools; 1500 (1000 Africans), nine secondary schools; 550, five technical schools; and 150 were attending universities in France. With 100 African secondary school graduates in government training programs, the Africanization of the lower administrative ranks in Gabon and Middle Congo is proceeding rapidly but the severe shortage of technically-trained labor hinders the development of the economy.

The economy of the country, despite post-war improvements, remains rudimentary, dependent on foreign capital for expansion, and vulnerable to French and world economic conditions. Products of farm, plantation, forest, and mine form nearly the total output of the economy. In 1956, only two products, cotton and wood, which have provided two-thirds of all exports since the Second World War, composed 70 per cent of the total exports. Indigenous industries are secondary industries concerned with simple transformation of basic commodities rather than heavy industries.

Despite important post-war urbanization, in 1955, only 1.17 per cent of the total population engaged in industry and only 5 per cent of the population were salaried. In 1956, direct consumption items—food-stuffs, beverages, textiles, and clothing—still comprised roughly 50 per cent of imports and equipment and semi-equipment, 28.4 per cent. Although exports have nearly doubled in tonnage and tripled in value since 1938, imports have regularly exceeded them.

	Imports *	Exports *
1950	13,394,000,000	7,254,000,000
1951	18,243,000,000	10,996,000,000
1952	20,129,000,000	10,227,000,000
1953	14,800,000,000	10,042,000,000
1954	16,681,000,000	12,795,000,000
1955	18,194,000,000	13,646,000,000
1956	20,526,000,000	14,134,600,000

* Imports and exports for 1950-1956 in francs C.F.A. (Colonies Françaises Africaines). 175 fr. C.F.A. equal one U. S. dollar while 350 fr. metropolitain equal one dollar.

Equatorial Africa depends entirely on outside sources, preponderantly French, for the funds needed to improve and expand the economy. Between 1949 and 1956, France spent \$202,571,428 through the *Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social* (FIDES), close to two-thirds as direct subsidies to the federation, territorial, railroad and port budgets and the rest as long term low interest loans through the *Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer*. Approximately three-fifths of the funds went for construction of 25,566 miles of roads, thirty-odd airports and the improvement of rail and port facilities.

The port of Pointe Noire now has an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons and Port Gentil, which handled 166,000 tons in 1950, handled 218,000 tons in the first half of 1957. The 320-mile Congo-Ocean Railroad from Pointe Noire to Brazzaville has been modernized. A new 4.3 mile shuttle railroad built above Brazzaville permits the passage of goods around a shallow section of the Congo in the March-April dry season. The remaining two-fifths of the funds went for education, health and the improvement of agriculture, grazing, forests, mines and electrification. Two new dams, one on the Djuwe River near Brazzaville and one near Bangi, provided 23,700,000 kwh in 1955. Half of the electricity produced by the Brazzaville Dam is sold to Leopoldville across the Congo River in the Belgian Congo. Through FIDES France plans to spend around \$25,000,000 more annually through 1958.

Foreign Trade

Both France and the *Grand Conseil* have tried recently to attract more non-French capital into the country. On March 23, 1957, the *Grand Conseil* instituted fiscal reforms, including lower taxes on industry, to attract investors. If the Eurafica Common Market Plan is carried out, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy in the next five years will invest \$310,000,000 in French Africa in return for lower tariffs and new markets for their goods.

On the average, during the last seven

years close to one-third of Equatorial Africa's exports went to and one-fifth of its imports came from these members of the European Payments Union, trade with them increasing both in volume and in percentage at the expense of trade with the sterling and dollar areas. Trade with West Germany alone increased from 500,000,000 fr. C.F.A. in 1950 to 2,500,000,000 fr. C.F.A. in 1956, West Germany buying 39 per cent of Equatorial Africa's okume wood in 1956. In the same period France and the French Union regularly purchased two-thirds of the country's exports and provided two-thirds of its imports.

The fact that two-thirds of the entire foreign trade of Equatorial Africa is with France and the French Union and that Equatorial Africa gets part of its budgetary funds and most of its capital for economic expansion from France makes its economy vulnerable to French economic conditions. During the past year, the country felt repercussions of the inflation and price increases in France that accompanied the dollar shortage and the attempts to combat it. France, to solve its own financial difficulties, raised export duties on a number of items that it sells to Equatorial Africa.

As a result, the price index at Brazzaville, set at 100 for 1949, which stood at 165 in October, 1956, jumped to 172 in January, 1957, and to 179.3 in July, 1957. Because of the increased price of imports coming from France without a proportional price increase for exports, imports exceeded exports by 4,600,000,000 fr. C.F.A. for the first half of 1957. To offset this, the country acted in mid-1957 to reduce imports, especially those coming from the dollar zone.⁷

At the same time, the country's dependence on just two products, cotton and wood, for two-thirds of its exports, makes any fluctuation in world market prices of those commodities of crucial importance to the entire country. Fortunately world demand and prices paid for wood have steadily increased and cotton prices have not fluctuated severely in recent years. On the other hand, French efforts to reduce the dependence of Gabon and Middle Congo on wood and of Ubangi-Shari and Chad on cotton by the expansion of cacao, coffee, groundnut,

and palm oil production have failed, largely because of a drop in world prices for those commodities.

To lessen the effects of any sharp changes in world market prices of cotton, cacao and coffee in the future, France in 1955 established a Stabilization Bank for each commodity. By price controls, the building of reserve funds and the storage of produce, much in the manner of Ghana's Cocoa Marketing Board, the banks are aiming towards increased production and decreased vulnerability.

Probably the most encouraging sign for the country's economy and of great strategic importance to France is the recent discovery of new minerals and metals in sufficient quantity to effect a favorable trade balance within three years. The country in 1954 produced 152,000 carats of diamonds worth 518 million fr. C.F.A., gold worth 275 million, lead worth 115 million, and columbite-tantalite worth 3.4 million. Since then important deposits of manganese, iron and petroleum and smaller quantities of many other minerals have been located. The Pointe-Clairrette area of Gabon produced 50,000 tons of petroleum worth 160,000,000 fr. C.F.A. in the first half of 1957 and annual production for 1958 may reach 300,000 tons.

In October, 1956, the Compagnie Minière de l'Ogooué (Comilog), 49 per cent owned by United States Steel, began construction of a 188-mile railway from the Franceville area of Gabon south to the Congo-Ocean Railroad in order to evacuate some of the 150,000,000 tons of 50 per cent manganese ore discovered in 1953. Expected annual production once the railway is completed will be at least 600,000 tons, worth 6,000,000,000 fr. C.F.A. at present prices. With world production of manganese at 2,550,000 tons in 1954 this will be one of the most important world sources.

In 1957, Bethlehem Steel and the government-owned Bureau Minier de la France d'Outre-Mer formed a company to exploit the estimated 500,000,000 tons of high-grade iron ore located in the Makoukou-Mekambo area of Gabon, 375 miles inland. In 1957,

⁷ *Chroniques d'outre-mer*, no. 38, Septembre-Octobre, 1957, pp. 36-37.

France began preliminary work on the Niari-Kouilou Sounda Gorge Dam 56 miles north of Pointe Noire and 44 miles from the sea. The dam will provide 8 billion kwh of electricity annually at a low cost of a franc per kwh.

France plans to establish an aluminum industry of 200,000-250,000 tons annually with ore from French Guiana and French Guinea, the low electricity costs offsetting the transportation costs. In addition, France plans to establish other metal-processing and nuclear industries and to expand the port of Pointe Noire to eight million tons annually. The dam, industries and port expansion will involve an investment of 100 billion fr. C.F.A.

The exploitation of the newly-discovered mineral wealth of Equatorial Africa will provide hundreds of new jobs for Africans in the next few years. It will bring further economic and social advances to add to the important advances made in the past decade. France has done much of which it can be proud in Equatorial Africa. It has built roads, airports, harbor facilities, schools, and hospitals. It has raised educational and health standards. Through French efforts thousands of Africans are living better than they did a decade ago.

But France has created more than material gains in Equatorial Africa. France has awakened in some of what used to be the most backward peoples in the world a desire for self-government and has created conditions through which these peoples are be-

coming increasingly capable of self-government. By its very efforts France has created a political situation in which as time passes it will find it increasingly more difficult to oppose the desire of the Africans for self-government. At the moment France still has the good will of the Africans.

So far Equatorial Africa has experienced none of the corrosive anti-western nationalism that has embittered African-European relations elsewhere in the continent. Many Equatorial African leaders well realize that only a long period of political stability with orderly progress towards self-government can attract the investment capital and direct subsidies their country needs for its continued economic and social progress. They are still looking to France with hopeful eyes. If France clings tightly to its centuries-old tradition of a strongly-centralized state, without adjusting that tradition to the mid-twentieth century African conditions which it in part has created, it may eventually lose Equatorial Africa. If France can adapt the structure of the French Union to permit gradual self-government for Equatorial Africa before that country is in a position to force self-government for itself, France may find Equatorial Africa willing to remain permanently within the French Union.

In the 1957 reforms France took a small step in the right direction. If she can move rapidly enough and graciously enough in granting self-government, Equatorial Africa, France, and the free world may be spared another tragedy like Indo-China or Algeria.



"Today, machine power and the use of oil, coal, electricity and other inanimate sources of energy (including the atom) have taken over practically our entire work load. It is no accident that the United States leads the world in per person use of inanimate energy, as it does in per person income.

"In 1850 more than one eighth of all our work was done by human beings and more than one half by horses, mules and oxen. Muscle power of animals and humans thus accounted for slightly less than two thirds of the work; and inanimate sources (steam, wind power, falling water, etc.) for a little more than a third. By 1900 the work-animal share had dropped to 22 per cent of the total and that of human workers to 5 per cent. Today, muscle power of either animals or humans has been all but eliminated and nearly 99 per cent of the total useful work-energy of the country comes from machines."

—From the *U.S.A. in New Dimensions* by Thomas R. Carskadon and George Soule.

Current Documents

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community and Its Relationship to Overseas Territories

In March, 1957, the nations of France, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed a treaty setting up a European Economic Community; provision was made in this treaty for the association of their overseas territories and nations with which they have "special relations." Here we reprint in full the articles relating to the association of overseas countries and territories; it is these articles which form the basis for European plans to develop the African nations.

Article 131

The Member States agree to associate with the Community the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. These countries and territories, hereinafter called "the countries and territories" are listed in Annex IV to the present Treaty.

The purpose of this association shall be to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole.

In conformity with the principles enunciated in the Preamble to the present Treaty, this association must in the first place permit of furthering the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories so as to bring them to the economic, cultural and social development they expect.

Article 132

The objectives of the association shall be as follows:

1. In their trade with the countries and territories Member States shall apply the same conditions as they accord each other by virtue of the present Treaty.
2. Each country or territory shall apply to its trade with Member States and with the other countries and territories, the conditions which it applies to the European State with which it has special relations.
3. Member States shall contribute to the investments required for the progressive development of these countries and territories.

4. As regards investment financed by the Community, participation in tenders and supplies shall be open, on equal terms, to all individuals and legal persons, nationals of Member States or of the countries and territories.

5. In relations between Member States and the countries and territories, the right of establishment of nationals and companies shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions and by application of the procedures laid down in the section relating to the right of establishment, and on a non-discriminatory basis, subject to the special measures taken under article 136.

Article 133

1. Goods originating in the countries and territories shall on importation into Member States benefit by the total abolition of customs duties, which is progressively to take place between Member States in conformity with the provisions of the present Treaty.

2. Customs duties on imports from Member States and from other countries and territories on entry into any country or territory shall be progressively abolished in conformity with the provisions of articles 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17.

3. Nevertheless, countries and territories may collect customs duties to meet the needs of their development and the requirements of their industrialization, or duties of a fiscal nature the purpose of which is to contribute to their budget.

The customs duties referred to in the foregoing sub-paragraph shall, however, be

progressively reduced to the level of those imposed on importation of products coming from the Member State with which each country or territory has special relations. The percentages and the timing of the reductions provided for under the present Treaty shall apply to the gap between the duty imposed on entry into the importing country or territory on a product coming from the Member State which has special relations with the country or territory concerned and the duty imposed on the same product coming from the community.

4. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to countries and territories which by reason of special international obligations by which they are bound, are already applying a non-discriminatory customs tariff at the time when the present Treaty comes into force.

5. The establishment or amendment of duties levied on goods imported into the countries and territories must not result, *de jure* or *de facto*, in any direct or indirect discrimination between imports coming from the various Member States.

Article 134

If the level of the duties applicable to goods coming from an outside country on entry into a country or territory is likely, having regard to the application of the provisions of article 133, paragraph 1, to result in the diversion of trade to the detriment of any Member State, the latter may ask the Commission to propose to other Member States the measures necessary to remedy the situation.

Article 135

Subject to the provisions relating to public health, public safety and public order, the free movement of workers from the countries and territories in Member States, and of workers from Member States in the countries and territories, shall be governed by subsequent conventions which shall require unanimity among Member States.

Article 136

For a first period of five years as from

the entry into force of the present Treaty an application Convention annexed to this Treaty shall determine details of method and procedure concerning the association of the countries and territories with the community.

Before the expiry of the Convention provided for in the foregoing sub-paragraph, the Council, voting unanimously, shall in the light of the results achieved, and on the basis of the principles embodied in the present Treaty, determine the arrangements to be made for a further period.

APPLICATORY CONVENTION RELATING TO THE ASSOCIATION OF THE OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES WITH THE COMMUNITY¹

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

DESIROUS of establishing the Applicatory Convention provided for in article 136 of the Treaty,

HAVE AGREED upon the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the present Treaty:

Article 1

The Member States shall participate under the conditions laid down hereunder, in any measures likely to promote the social and economic development of the countries and territories listed in annex IV to the Treaty, their action in this matter being complementary to that taken by the authorities responsible for those countries or territories.

With this object, there shall be set up a development fund for the overseas countries and territories, into which the Member States shall, during a period of five years, pay the annual contributions provided for in annex A to the present Convention.

The fund shall be administered by the Commission.

Article 2

The authorities responsible for the coun-

¹ Provisional translation prepared by the European Coal and Steel Community.

tries and territories shall, in agreement with the local authorities or representatives of the people of the countries or territories concerned, submit to the Commission any social or economic projects for which financing by the Community is requested.

Article 3

The Commission shall each year draw up general programmes showing how the resources available in virtue of annex B to the present Convention shall be allocated between different categories of projects.

Such general programmes shall comprise projects for financing:

(a) Certain social institutions, in particular hospitals, teaching or technical research establishments and institutions for vocational training and the promotion of professional activities among the populations.

(b) Economic investments of general interest directly connected with the implementation of a programme including specific schemes for productive development.

Article 4

At the beginning of each financial year, the Council, after consulting the Commission, shall decide by the prescribed majority the amounts to be devoted to the financing of:

(a) The social institutions referred to in article 3 (a).

(b) The economic investments of general interest referred to in article 3 (b).

In taking its decision, the Council shall endeavour to distribute the amounts available on a rational geographical basis.

Article 5

1. The Commission shall determine the allocation of the amounts available in virtue of article 4 (a) between the various requests received for the financing of social institutions.

2. The Commission shall draw up proposals for financing such economic investment schemes as it approves in virtue of article 4 (b).

It shall transmit these proposals to the Council.

If, within a period of one month, no Member State requests that such proposals be considered by the Council they shall be regarded as approved.

If such proposals are considered by the Council, the latter decision shall be taken by the prescribed majority within a period of two months.

3. Any amounts not allocated during one year shall be carried forward to future years.

4. The amounts allocated shall be made available to the authorities responsible for carrying out the work in question. The Commission shall ensure that they are utilized in conformity with the allocations decided upon and to the best economic advantage.

Article 6

The Council, voting with the prescribed majority, on a proposal by the Commission, shall, within six months from the entry into force of the Treaty, establish the conditions governing calls for and transfers of financial contributions, budgeting and administration of the resources of the Development Fund.

Article 7

The prescribed majority referred to in articles 4, 5 and 6 above shall be sixty-seven votes. The Member States shall have the following number of votes, respectively

Belgium	11 votes
France	33 votes
Federal Republic of Germany	33 votes
Italy	11 votes
Luxembourg	1 vote
Netherlands	11 votes

Article 8

In each of the countries or territories, the right of establishment shall be extended progressively to nationals and companies of Member States other than the one having special relations with the country or territory in question. During the first year of application of the present Convention, the

Council, voting with the prescribed majority on a proposal by the Commission, shall decide upon the means by which this shall be done, so as to achieve the gradual disappearance of all discrimination during the transitional period.

Article 9

The customs treatment applied to trade between Member States and the countries and territories shall be that provided for in articles 133 and 134.

Article 10

While the present Convention remains in force, Member States shall apply to their trade with the countries and territories the provisions of the section of the Treaty relating to the abolition of quantitative restrictions between Member States that they apply during the same period in their mutual relations.

Article 11

1. In each of the countries or territories where import quotas exist and one year after the entry into force of the present convention, quotas open to States other than the one with which such country or territory has special relations shall be converted into global quotas open without discrimination to other Member States. From the same date, these quotas shall be increased each year by the application of the provisions of article 32 and of paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of article 33 of the Treaty.

2. When the global quota for a product not on the free list represents less than 7 per cent of the total imports into a country or territory, a quota equal to 7 per cent of such imports shall be established not later than one year after the entry into force of the present Convention, and shall be increased annually in accordance with the provisions referred to in paragraph 1 above.

3. In the case of certain products for which no quota exists for imports into a country or territory, the Commission shall, by way of decision, determine the methods by which the quotas offered to other Member States shall be opened and increased.

Article 12

Whenever import quotas established by Member States cover both imports coming from a State having special relations with a country or territory and imports coming from that country or territory, the proportion of imports coming from countries and territories shall be the subject of a global quota based on import statistics. The said quotas shall be fixed during the first year of application of the present Convention and shall be increased in accordance with the rules referred to in article 10.

Article 13

The provisions of article 10 shall not debar prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or transit when these are justified on grounds of public morality, public order or public security, the protection of the health or life of persons or animals or the preservation of plant life, the protection of national possessions of artistic, historical or archaeological value or the protection of industrial or commercial property. Nevertheless, such prohibitions or restrictions must not constitute either a means of arbitrary discrimination, or a disguised restriction on trade.

Article 14

After the date of expiration of the present Convention, and until provision has been made for association during a further period, import quotas in the countries and territories and in the Member States in respect of products originating in the countries and territories, shall remain at the level fixed for the fifth year. Arrangements regarding the right of establishment in force at the end of the fifth year shall also be maintained.

Article 15

(This article deals with imports and tariff quotas relating to unroasted coffee, bananas, and cocoa beans.)

Article 16

The provisions contained in articles 1 to

8 inclusive of the present Convention shall apply to Algeria and the French Overseas Departments.

Article 17

Without prejudice to the application of the provisions of articles 14 and 15, the present Convention shall be concluded for a period of five years.

ANNEX IV

OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES TO WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF PART 4 OF THE TREATY APPLY

French West Africa, comprising: Senegal,

Sudan, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauritania, Niger and Upper Volta;

French Equatorial Africa, comprising: Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Chad and Gabon;

St. Pierre and Miquelon, Comoro Archipelago, Madagascar and dependencies, French Somaliland, New Caledonia and dependencies, French Establishments in Oceania, Antarctic possessions (*Terres australes et antarctiques*);

Autonomous Republic of Togoland;

Trust Territory of the Cameroons under French administration;

Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi;

Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration;

Netherlands New Guinea.

ANNEX A

as provided for in

ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONVENTION

	1st year	2nd year	3rd year	4th year	5th year	Total
Percentages	10	12.5	16.5	22.5	38.5	100
Countries	(in millions of E.P.U. units of account)					
Belgium	7	8.75	11.55	15.75	26.95	70
France	20	25	33	45	77	200
Federal Republic of Germany	20	25	33	45	77	200
Italy	4	5	6.60	9	15.40	40
Luxembourg	0.125	0.15625	0.20625	0.28125	0.48125	1.25
Netherlands	7	8.75	11.55	15.75	26.95	70

ANNEX B

as provided for in

ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

	1st year	2nd year	3rd year	4th year	5th year	Total
Percentages	10	12.5	16.5	22.5	38.5	100
Overseas countries and territories	(in millions of E.P.U. units of account)					
Belgium	3	3.75	4.95	6.75	11.55	30
France	51.125	63.906	84.356	115.031	196.832	511.25
Italy	0.5	0.625	0.825	1.125	1.925	5
Netherlands	3.5	4.375	5.775	7.875	13.475	35

Received at Our Desk

NATIONALISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA.

By THOMAS HODGKIN. (New York: New York University Press, 1957. 190 pages, maps, notes and index, \$3.75.)

This is a penetrating analysis of colonial policies and African nationalism by one of the foremost authorities in the field. Noting that the policies of the European powers which control most of Africa largely determine the framework within which African nationalism can operate, Thomas Hodgkin devotes the first part of his study to an examination of French, English and Belgian administrative systems. He points out the contradictions and weaknesses of the policies of all three powers.

The second part of Mr. Hodgkin's study deals with other political, economic and social factors which have largely determined the ideas and means of activity of the various African national movements. These include the shift of large parts of the population to the towns, the character of life in the cities, the contributions of religious organizations, African associations and clubs and the labor unions to nationalist activities and the transfer of African leadership from the chiefs to the newly educated élite. African parties and congresses are also treated in an exceptionally valuable chapter.

Regarding the future, some of the author's conclusions are that "whether national movements employ violent or non-violent methods to gain their objects seems likely to depend primarily upon the attitudes of the colonial regimes. The European ascendancy in Africa is not likely to make itself more acceptable to nationalists simply by the device of inventing new terminology with which to describe itself—*Eurafrique*, *La Communauté Belgo-Congolaise*, 'Partnership,' 'the Multi-racial State' and the like."

Finally, he feels "that the colonial powers must recognize that the period of Euro-

pean ascendancy in Africa is drawing to an end," and concentrate "upon the problem how to ensure that its end does not inflict avoidable suffering, upon Africans, Asians, or Europeans. . . ."

—M. M.

THE WELLS OF IBN SA'UD. By D. VAN DER MEULEN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. 270 pages, photographs, glossary, and index, \$5.50.)

This is the story of Ibn Sa'ud and of the new nation, Saudi Arabia, revealed through the personal experiences and knowledge of a Dutch official. Having been stationed in Arabia from 1926 to 1931 and from 1941 to 1945, and having revisited the country in 1952 and 1954, Mr. van der Meulen was able to witness the emergence of a country from early Muslim ways into the modern materialism of the West.

The author first describes the pilgrim town of Jedda as it was when he arrived there in 1926. He next explores the influence of the austere Wahhabi faith upon the Sa'ud dynasty and then traces the political developments of the Arab peninsula—particularly Ibn Sa'ud's rise to power and his rule. He critically discusses early British-Arab relations, the Palestine question and the Arab League, and the effect upon Arab life—particularly on the economy and religious faith—of the arrival of the American oil companies and technical experts. He concludes on a note of sadness for he does not feel that the present government is prepared to cope with the new situation which has developed.

This is a warm and sympathetic story enriched by the author's vivid descriptions of Arab life, his accounts of his talks with Ibn Sa'ud and of his acquaintance with St. John Philby and other influential European and Arab people. And being Dutch, he is able to report impartially on the

roles played by the British and Americans. The general reader will be left with a feeling of closeness to Arabia and with a greater understanding of its problems as it faces the invasion of modern materialism.

—Margaret D. Bishop

NATIONALISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA

BY THOMAS HODGKIN

SOUTH AFRICA. Economic and Political Aspects. By HECTOR M. ROBERTSON. (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957. 192 pages, glossary, bibliography with index, \$3.50.)

The central theme of this book is race relations in South Africa. Consisting of three essays, the first briefly surveys the history of the Union, emphasizing the relations of black and white in the South African economy. The second, "Apartheid and the African Economy" discusses the current economic situation which has led to a re-disbursement of the various peoples and toward the development of a dual society known as apartheid. Particular attention is given to a discussion of the Tomlinson Report. Mr. Robertson concludes that "if apartheid is regarded as the final solution to the race problems of South Africa, a view of the South African economy must pose sobering reflections on the many great problems which would be created in the attempts to carry it through."

The final chapter deals with the constitutional struggle concerning "the origin of the entrenched clauses of the South Africa Act with regard to the franchise and the recent attempts to ignore them in removing the Cape Colored voters from the common voters' roll."

The author, born and educated in England, has long resided in the Union of South Africa. His wide knowledge of some of the more particular aspects of the situation points up the problems of race relations in the political and economic areas.

—M. B.

New towns, new social associations, new theories and myths, new political parties, and trade unions are transforming the pattern of African living. In particular, they mark the growth and strengthening influence of postwar nationalism among Africans.

What these institutions are, how they operate, and in what important ways they account for contemporary African nationalism is the subject of Mr. Hodgkin's book.

✠ Mr. Hodgkin shows how Africans are recovering the sense of common purpose that traditional African society enjoyed in tribal organization;

✠ He explains in intelligent and understandable terms the complex and interesting civilizations that Africans inherit from their past;

✠ He considers the widely different policies of the European powers and their effect on African movements and attitudes.

\$3.75



NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS

Washington Square, New York 3, New York

WILL THE MIDDLE EAST GO WEST?

By FRED A. UTLEY. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957. 198 pages with bibliography, \$3.00.)

In her analysis of the situation in the Middle East, Freda Utley is highly sym-

pathetic to the Arab cause. She is also very concerned about the West's policies in the Arab world. Her criticisms spare no one—neither the “liberals” nor the “conservatives” of the United States, nor the British, the French, or the Israelis.

It is Miss Utley's thesis that “there is so close a similarity between the situation in the Arab world today and that of China yesterday that if the West is able to perceive the parallel, we may avoid repeating the errors of judgment and policy which only a few years ago lost almost half a continent to the Communists.”

Her chapters, “Background to Suez,” “In the Holy Land,” and “Israel: Our Problem” are not only slanted in favor of the Arab world and against Israel and the Zionist movement, but also contain statements of fact which are open to serious question. Furthermore, in the opinion of this reviewer, she seems to support much of the Arab propaganda and to brush over or almost excuse Arab misdeeds.

—M. B.

THE ECONOMICS OF UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By PETER T. BAUER and BASIL S. YAMEY. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957. 271 pages with index, \$2.25.)

Today, we read a great deal about the needs of the underdeveloped countries for economic development, but few of us really understand the principles, factors and problems involved. This Cambridge Economic Handbook offers an authoritative and also readable analysis of the subject. While the material is presented in a straightforward and systematic manner, no attempt is made to oversimplify the complexity of the many factors involved. The authors' lucid style is enhanced—particularly in the first part—by the inclusion of numerous practical and sometimes poignant examples, drawn from a wide variety of events, practices, and situations.

Part One serves “to illumine certain features of the economic landscape of the underdeveloped world.” Discussed first are the problems of economic measurement in relation to national income, cap-

ital, and the labor force. Next the authors examine the various economic resources, i.e., the natural, the human, and the capital resources.

Part Two deals with the role of government in promoting economic development. After a general appraisal of the topic, the authors turn to more specific matters, such as the functions of the government, the matter of accelerated capital formation, and the policy measures affecting agriculture and the manufacturing industry. Emphasized throughout this section is the role of government in raising the level of capital formation.

—M. B.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. Edited by C. GROVE HAINES. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957. 310 pages with index, \$5.00.)

“Europe will be. It will be because it has to be. Indeed, it is already coming about. But will the forces leading to its creation be powerful enough to succeed before it is too late? Which are the most effective, the most certain methods for achieving this goal? Should one proceed by stages—or should one pass them by and go immediately to a comprehensive solution?”

It is with the above questions that this book is very directly concerned. A symposium, it offers access to the thoughts and plans of some of the most noteworthy figures connected with European integration. The essays were originally presented as papers at a conference on “The Status of European Integration” convoked during May-June, 1956, under the sponsorship of the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University.

Briefly stated, the subjects considered include the historical background of the integration movement; its economic, political, and less directly, its social aspects; and its effect on the U.S., U.S.S.R., Asia, and the British Commonwealth.

This book cannot be too highly recommended to the reader seriously interested in European affairs. The articles are thoughtful and thought provoking, as well as informative.—M. B.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Asian-African People's Solidarity Conference

December 26—Over 400 delegates from 39 Asian and African countries attend the opening of a "people's conference" in Cairo.

December 27—The Soviet Union tells the Asian-African nations meeting in Cairo that it will provide, "to the best of our capabilities, money in the form of loans or aid," to assist these nations.

December 28—The Soviet Union tells the Asian-African peoples that it supports all movements for national independence.

December 29—It is reported that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser is concerned because of the strong pro-Communist line taken by the Asian-African delegates. He has ordered the Egyptian press to play down the conference.

December 30—The Asian-African delegates draw up an appeal to the U.S. and Great Britain to accept the Soviet proposal to halt the testing of nuclear weapons.

United Nations

December 3—The Special Political Committee postpones the enlargement of key groups in the U.N. for a year.

December 12—The General Assembly resolves to ask member states to give financial help to operate the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.

December 14—The General Assembly passes an enabling resolution providing for the creation of a \$100 million special projects fund and, ultimately, for a capital development fund involving yearly expenditures of \$500 million.

The General Assembly votes to apply a 3 per cent surcharge to Suez Canal traffic.

The twelfth session of the General Assembly ends with a plea for peace.

West Europe

December 14—Fifteen foreign ministers of the Council of Europe approve a resolution sponsored by Great Britain calling for the establishment of a free trade area for Europe.

President Eisenhower arrives in Paris for the NATO meeting.

December 16—The United States offers nuclear arms, economic aid and instant support in the event of Soviet aggression to its Atlantic allies.

December 18—The NATO allies reach some agreement in principle but no formal commitment is made at the NATO conference.

December 19—The first top-level meeting of NATO government powers ends, with the European powers agreeing to the establishment of missile bases in Europe, and the U. S. agreeing to remain "ready to discuss any reasonable proposal" leading to "comprehensive and controlled disarmament."

December 20—A European Nuclear Energy Agency is set up by 17 West European nations for cooperative work in the peacetime atomic field.

December 30—The High Authority of the European Coal-Steel Pool reveals that steel output of the six-nation pool reached 60 million tons in 1957, compared with 57 million tons in 1956.

BELGIAN CONGO

December 8—Africans and Belgians are permitted to vote for councilmen for the first time. The Belgian administration reserves the right to annul the elections of candidates of whom it does not approve. Hence, the voting is called a "consultation" rather than an election.

December 9—The Abako tribe captures 130 of the 170 seats open to Negroes on the 8 township councils.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Canada

- December 4—Former Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson says he will seek the leadership of the Liberal party when Louis St. Laurent retires.
- December 6—Minister of Finance Donald Fleming reveals a small cut in taxes and forecasts a small surplus.
- December 11—West Germany and Canada sign an agreement to cooperate in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

Ceylon

- December 17—It is revealed in Colombo that a 17-man mission from the U.S.S.R. is expected in Colombo to discuss economic and trade cooperation between Ceylon and the Soviet Union.
- December 26—Ceylon asks India for help in combating floods.
- December 29—As 300,000 are reported homeless, President Eisenhower asks the U. S. Navy to help flood-stricken Ceylon.

Ghana

- December 11—Parliament adopts a bill on second reading prohibiting the forming of political parties based on race, tribe or religion.

Great Britain

- December 3—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan tells Commons that only if Britain and the U. S. agree will bombers based in Britain be armed with nuclear weapons.
- December 4—West Germany's Foreign Minister, Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, arrives in London for a three-day conference. The British government is trying to secure an equitable settlement on the question of German contributions toward expenses for maintaining British forces in Bonn.
- December 5—The House of Lords unanimously approves a bill allowing women to sit in the upper House. The bill must survive the formality of a third reading and must be approved by Commons.

December 6—It is revealed in Washington that the U. S. and Britain have agreed to set up four squadrons of intermediate range ballistic missiles in Britain. The cost is estimated at \$84 million, to be paid for the most part by Britain.

December 12—British-Egyptian financial talks in Rome are "adjourned for a few weeks" so that delegates can report to their governments.

December 18—Labor party spokesmen object to the establishment of missile bases in Britain.

December 20—The House of Commons approves the Conservative party's foreign policy including plans for U. S. missile bases in Britain with a vote of 289 to 251.

December 23—The Organization for European Economic Cooperation says that Britain's economy is better balanced than it has been in several years.

December 31—The Government says that a top-level meeting between the U.S.S.R. and the Western powers might increase world tension.

India

December 2—The U.N. Security Council approves a trip to be made by Frank P. Graham, U.N. mediator in the Kashmir dispute, to visit India and Kashmir and make recommendations.

December 4—Home Minister G. B. Pant reports to Parliament on the arrest of 2884 Dravidians, because of violence against Brahmins in South India.

December 5—The U. S. and India announce a program to help India wipe out malaria.

December 6—The British-owned Burmah Oil Company agrees to loan India the equivalent of \$28 million in sterling to build a pipe line from Assam to a new refinery.

December 20—The Preventive Detention Bill, empowering the Government to jail those suspected of subversive activity without trial, is approved by the upper house of Parliament. The lower house has already approved the bill.

December 22—The Education Ministry decides that Hindi will become the first language of Indian universities; English, now first, is to take second place.

Malaya, Federation of

December 6—Abdul Rahman, Premier of the Federation of Malaya, gives the Communists until December 31 to arrange a preliminary meeting to discuss the ten-year emergency.

December 16—Premier Abdul Rahman extends the offer of amnesty to Communists to April 30.

New Zealand

December 12—Walter Nash, who succeeds Keith Holyoake, is sworn in as Prime Minister; he will also be Minister of External Affairs and Maori Affairs.

Pakistan

December 6—The U. S. and Pakistan sign an agreement for commodities aid, under which Pakistan will import iron, steel, sugar, coal, fertilizers, vehicles and spare parts worth \$10 million.

December 16—Malik Firoz Khan Noon, 64-year-old Republican leader, becomes seventh prime minister of Pakistan; he replaces Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar of the Muslim League.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

British Honduras

December 6—At the request of Governor Sir Colin Thornley, the garrison is reinforced.

Cyprus

December 3—Governor Sir Hugh Foot arrives in Nicosia, succeeding Field Marshal Sir John Harding.

December 9—As the Cyprus question is debated in the U.N., riots break out in Cyprus.

December 11—Britain says that her pledges still hold for self-government in the crown colony of Cyprus.

December 14—The General Assembly of the U.N. rejects a Greek resolution asking that the Cypriotes be allowed to vote on their own future. The vote is 31 to 23.

Malta

December 30—The Parliament approves Prime Minister Dom Mintoff's motion asking that ties with Britain be broken.

BULGARIA

December 22—Bulgarians elect a new 245-man Parliament. Only one slate of Communist candidates is presented to the voters.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

December 18—Three American mothers receive permission from the Chinese Communist government to visit their imprisoned sons. (See also U.S. Foreign Affairs.)

December 25—Total grain output during the First Five Year Plan reached 859,600,000 tons, 12,500,000 tons higher than anticipated.

COLOMBIA

December 1—Voters go to the polls to decide whether to amend the 1866 Constitution to provide for 12 years of joint rule by Conservatives and Liberals.

December 2—Results from yesterday's elections favor the establishment of 12 years of bipartisan government. The 2 parties will jointly name presidential candidates under the new system.

December 11—In a Cabinet shuffle, Brigadier General Pioquinto Rengifo is appointed Minister of the Interior to handle neutrally the transition back to more democratic government. Rengifo succeeds José María Villarreal, a Conservative.

CUBA

December 25—Reports from Oriente Province agree that the rebel forces of Fidel Castro are increasing in number. There is also an increase in the number of raids to secure food and other supplies.

EGYPT (see also International)

December 9—Foreign Minister of Egypt

Mahmoud Fawzi calls on U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to discuss questions of mutual concern.

FRANCE

December 3—A small price rise is permitted by the government, raising the cost of living index 2.7 per cent.

December 6—In a desperate move to bolster foreign reserves, France orders all French banks to give her 30 per cent of their dollar credits abroad, i.e., Frenchmen must loan the government 30 per cent of the dollar credits which they hold abroad at 3 per cent interest.

December 10—A compromise on the Socialists' demand to give a 10 per cent pay rise to government employees is reached.

December 12—The upper house of the French parliament, the Council of the Republic, approves a bill providing for \$238 million in new taxes. The National Assembly earlier approved the emergency tax legislation.

THE FRENCH EMPIRE

Algeria

December 3—U. S. delegate Henry Cabot Lodge tells the Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly that France has taken a step forward with the Algerian reform bill. He warns the United Nations against taking action which might reduce the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Algerian situation.

December 10—The General Assembly adopts a compromise resolution on the Algerian situation calling for "pourparlers," or talks. The French accept the resolution as a "testimony of confidence in the French position."

December 13—The Commission for the Safeguard of Rights and Individual Liberties, investigating French excesses in Algeria, reveals that French troops did resort to brutality in dealing with nationalists.

GERMANY (West)

December 18—Minister of Defense Franz

Josef Strauss and another official express the doubt that West Germany will accept U. S. intermediate range missiles and nuclear warheads.

HUNGARY

December 4—Thai Prince Wan Waithayakon, special U.N. representative to investigate the Hungarian situation, declares that his 3-month effort to persuade Moscow and Budapest to heed U.N. resolutions on Hungary has come to naught.

December 10—The U.N. General Assembly votes in favor of the report of its credentials committee on the Hungarian delegates. The Credentials Committee took no action on the legality of the delegates' credentials.

December 29—Improving church-state relations, Hungary cancels the 25 per cent reduction in aid to the Calvinist Church.

INDONESIA

December 1—The government orders a 24-hour strike against Dutch businesses in protest over Dutch rule of West New Guinea.

December 2—Indonesians stage the government-ordered walkout against Dutch business enterprises.

December 5—Indonesian indignation over continued Dutch control of West New Guinea mounts. All Dutch consular missions except that in Jakarta are asked to close. The government takes over the operation of Dutch harbor enterprises, and the management of the Dutch shipping concern, KPM. The Minister of Justice announces plans for the expulsion of Dutch nationals from the country.

December 7—Millions of dollars worth of Dutch property are seized by workers against government orders. Workers' delegates take over the 3 Dutch banks in Jakarta. In Medan, in northeast Sumatra, Dutch enterprises are put under military supervision by Lt. Col. Djamin Ginting.

December 9—Indonesia expropriates Dutch agricultural properties. The 3 Dutch banks taken over by workers' groups are placed under the supervision of the military and the central Bank of Indonesia.

December 12—Premier Djuanda announces that President Sukarno will leave for a rest in another country on the advice of his physicians. A Netherlands broadcast gives an announcement from a source in Jakarta that President Sukarno is a prisoner and that the government is under the control of Premier Djuanda, former Vice-President Mohammed Hatta and Chief of Staff Major General Abdul Haris Nasution.

December 13—Speaker of Parliament Dr. Sartono is to take over as acting president during Sukarno's absence.

December 23—The Netherlands lodges a protest with the United Nations over Indonesian policy toward Dutch citizens and property in Indonesia.

December 26—An Indonesian official announces that his government will look to the Communist bloc for arms shipments because of the U. S. failure to respond to Indonesia's arms request.

IRAN

December 13—A 2-minute earthquake kills many; other Iranians are left homeless in freezing weather.

IRAQ

December 15—Defense Minister Abdul Wahab Marjan is sworn in as premier following the resignation of Ali Jawdat last week.

December 22—Iraq lowers the amount that banks may invest outside the country from 50 per cent of their capital and deposits to 30 per cent.

December 25—Iraq recalls its permanent representative to the U.N. because he voted against Turkey in the recent Cyprus debate in that world body.

ISRAEL

December 3—Premier David Ben-Gurion and U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, meeting in Israel, fail to solve the Israeli-Jordan border impasse.

December 23—A Communist attempt to overthrow the present government of Ben-

Gurion on a confidence vote is defeated in the Knesset.

December 24—Israel plans to send a mission to West Germany to purchase military equipment.

December 27—In response to Israel's intentions to seek arms from West Germany, the West German government declares that it usually does not permit arms shipments to "areas that are centers of acute conflict."

December 30—Following recent conflict in Ben-Gurion's Cabinet over the projected mission to negotiate an arms deal with West Germany, the government falls.

ITALY

December 8—It is reported that the Italian Communist party lost one half million members in 3 years, a membership drop of 15 per cent.

December 10—Italy and the Soviet Union sign a trade pact providing for \$60 million in trade from 1958 to 1961.

December 27—Italy celebrates the tenth anniversary of its republican government.

JAPAN

December 6—The Soviet Union and Japan sign 3 treaties; a 5-year commerce and navigation pact; a 1-year trade and payments pact; and an agreement establishing a Soviet trade mission in Japan.

JORDAN

December 1—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld arrives in Jordan and begins discussion on the demilitarized Mount Scopus area with a view to strengthening the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization.

December 2—Discussion between the U.N. and Jordanian officials ends successfully; Jordan expresses its desire "to maintain the fullest cooperation" with the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization.

December 4—The conflict over Jordan's barring passage of the U.N. convoy carrying supplies to the Israeli guard on Mount Scopus is resolved. The convoy is allowed to pass.

KOREA

December 31—Japan and South Korea sign an agreement providing for the repatriation of each other's captive nationals.

LEBANON

December 6—It is reported that Syrians invaded a Lebanon police post, removing arms and ammunition. The Lebanese Internal Security Council is called to discuss the situation.

December 23—President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon and Shah Mohammed Riza of Iran end week-long discussions.

THE MALDIVIVE ISLANDS

December 18—Ibrahim Nasir is appointed premier following the resignation of Amir Ibrahim Ali Didi for reasons of health.

MOROCCO

December 1—Reports indicate that Spanish troops are in control of Ifni.

December 2—Spain concedes that fighting has spread from Ifni, the Spanish enclave in Morocco, to Spanish West Africa.

December 6—The Spanish Embassy in Rabat announces that Spain is willing to reopen talks on Ifni.

December 7—Spanish warships dispatched to Morocco stand by near the port of Agadir.

December 8—Spanish troops retreat from 3 army posts in Ifni.

December 9—Spanish troops are preparing a 5-mile deep defense perimeter, at the center of which is Ifni's capital, Sidi Ifni, by order of Spain's Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

December 15—It is reported that Spain has ordered its Foreign Legion to reinforce its post at Villa Bens in Spanish West Africa.

December 27—In response to anti-Moroccan feeling sweeping Spain, Generalissimo Franco disbands his Moorish Guard of Honor.

PARAGUAY

December 27—Paraguay agrees to receive

150,000 Japanese immigrants in exchange for a \$12 million loan from Japan.

PHILIPPINES

December 6—Japanese Premier Nobusuke Kishi arrives in the Philippines on his tour through Southeast Asia.

December 7—Premier Kishi and Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia are unable to reach agreement on questions of trade and reparations between their countries.

December 10—It is reported that the Philippines has come to the end of its dollar reserves. Yesterday bank credits on imports and profits from foreign investments were stopped until the unfavorable balance of trade is righted.

December 30—President Garcia is sworn in as the fourth President of the Republic.

POLAND

December 13—The Chamber of State Control, abolished in 1952, is re-established to investigate and check excesses of the Communist regime.

December 23—Yemen and Poland agree to the establishment of diplomatic relations. They also sign a trade agreement.

SAUDI ARABIA

December 4—King Faisal of Iraq and King Saud agree to cultural, economic and trade pacts.

December 7—Faisal and Saud issue a joint communique whereby they pledge themselves to support Arab unity.

SPAIN (see Morocco)**SYRIA**

December 9—Syria refuses to cooperate further with Chairman of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission Colonel Christian Moe.

December 11—Syria and the Soviet Union sign an economic assistance treaty.

THAILAND

December 15—Voters go to the polls to elect deputies to the National Assembly.
 December 27—Final returns show that the moderate Unionist party, which has since merged with the Nationalist Socialists, took 45 seats in the recent elections. The remainder of the 160 seats in question is divided as follows: Right-wing Democrats, 39; Leftist parties, 15; Independents, 61.

TUNISIA

December 12 — President Bourguiba announces that an Egyptian ship with arms for Tunisia has arrived.
 December 23—West Germany and Tunisia sign a trade agreement.
 December 28—Bourguiba declares that all French troops must be removed from Tunisia by March 20, 1958.

TURKEY

December 2—The highest budget to date—\$1.640 billion—is presented to Parliament.
 December 5—By a vote of 403 to 133, the program of the new government of Premier Adnan Menderes is approved by Parliament.
 December 10—A government bill to provide arms to Lebanon is withdrawn by the Premier's office from parliamentary consideration. The assumed motive for the action is Lebanon's vote in favor of Cyprus during the recent U.N. debate.
 December 23—Iraq apologizes to Turkey for its vote in favor of Cyprus during the debate in the U.N.

THE U.S.S.R.

December 4—Two Soviet scientists imply that the Soviet Union has a rocket that can be fired from a submerged submarine a distance of 750 miles.
 December 7—Soviet scientists assert that the first carrier rocket has fallen on Alaska. They demand that the U.S. return the shattered pieces.
 December 12—The Soviet Union asks the member states of the U.N. to back "peaceful coexistence." It reiterates the request

for a non-aggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.

December 13—The Russians offer to establish a code to facilitate the tracking of satellites and the exchange of this information.
 December 14—In a shakeup of the organization of its defense industry, the Soviet Union abolishes the Ministries of Defense Industry, Aviation Industry, Shipbuilding and Radio-Technical Industry. Replacing them are state committees of Defense Technology, Aviation Technology, Shipbuilding Technology and Radio and Electronic Technology. The new committees are placed under the over-all supervision of a newly appointed fourth Deputy Premier, former Minister of Defense Dmitri F. Ustinov.
 December 18—It is reported that Nurutdin Mukhitdinov was promoted from candidate to full membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee at a meeting last week of the Central Committee. Mukhitdinov along with Presidium members Alexei I. Kirichenko and Nikolai G. Ignatov is made a secretary of the Central Committee.
 December 19—Soviet industrial output increased by 10 per cent in 1957, according to figures released. The anticipated growth for the year was 7.1 per cent.
 December 20—President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Alexander N. Nesmeyanov, tells the Council of the Union (house of parliament) that the Soviet Union must take great strides before it can overtake the U.S. in all branches of science.
 December 21—Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko voices his country's opposition to the NATO proposal for a renewal of disarmament talks either within the U.N. Disarmament Commission or at a conference of foreign ministers. The Soviet Union declares that disarmament talks should take place within the U.N. General Assembly or at a conference of all the countries of the world, both Communist and non-Communist.
 December 24—The Soviet Union announces a replacement for its Ambassador to the U.S., Georgi N. Zaroubin. Mikhail A. Menshikov will take over these duties.

Nikita S. Khrushchev declares that his country is considering some reduction in its armed forces. He also reveals that the 1957 grain crop has fallen short of expectations. It is estimated that the grain crop equals that of 1955.

December 26—Reorganization of the party hierarchy follows the news about the disappointing grain crop for 1957: Presidium member and agricultural aide to Khrushchev, Nikolai I. Belyayev, is appointed party leader in Kazakhstan to accelerate grain output.

Vladimir I. Ustinov is appointed First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. Mme. Yekaterina A. Furtseva is relieved of this post because of her duties in the Communist party secretariat.

December 30—The Soviet Union and the U.S. agree to exchange cultural, agricultural, scientific and technical knowledge.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

December 23—The Department of Agriculture publishes figures revealing that 67 farms received more than \$50,000 each for not growing cotton, wheat and rice.

December 26—The Department of Agriculture reveals that farm surplus production was cut by more than a billion dollars worth of crops in 1957.

Civil Rights

December 2—The Virginia Supreme Court says the Pupil Placement Board may assign pupils when race is not a factor.

United States Judge Ben Harrison dismisses the case against ten California Communist leaders accused of conspiracy under the terms of the Smith Act.

December 3—Retired Supreme Court Justice Stanley F. Reed says he cannot serve as chairman of the new Civil Rights Commission.

December 11—Governor Price Daniel of Texas signs a bill to permit public school closings if troop intervention is threatened to force integration.

December 17—A Negro girl is suspended from Little Rock's Central High School because "she lost her temper and dumped food" on two white boys.

Alabama voters move to change the state constitution to allow the Legislature to abolish Macon County where Negroes have a majority over whites of more than seven to one. Final decision goes to a special legislature committee.

December 18—At Little Rock, 468 more Arkansas Guardsmen are released to inactive duty.

December 23—President Eisenhower names John A. Hannah, President of Michigan State University, to replace Stanley F. Reed as head of the new Civil Rights Commission.

December 27—The Fifth Federal Circuit Court reverses an order by Federal District Judge William H. Atwell and delays the integration of schools in Dallas, Texas.

Foreign Affairs

December 3—Adlai Stevenson declines the President's invitation to attend the NATO conference in Paris, to avoid being identified "with decisions I might not always agree with and could not publicly oppose."

In a recorded interview made for the British Broadcasting Corporation, Secretary of State Dulles says he sees little use in conferring with the Russians.

December 6—The State Department decides to let American citizens visit relatives imprisoned in Communist China.

December 7—It is revealed in Washington that the U.S. expects to continue economic aid to Yugoslavia in 1958.

December 12—Adlai Stevenson leaves his post as temporary State Department consultant, urging the President to take an "affirmative" view of Bulganin's latest proposals.

President Eisenhower leaves for the NATO conference in Paris.

December 13—Marion B. Folsom, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, says that the United States and the Soviet Union have tentatively agreed to exchange education specialists.

December 15—Speaking in Paris, President

Eisenhower says that a ban on nuclear weapons testing might add to the threat of war.

Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanon's Foreign Minister, says that Eisenhower has assured the Arab states that no decisions affecting their vital interests will be taken at the NATO conference without consulting them.

December 19—Summing up the NATO conference, Eisenhower says that decisions there "should make war less likely, peace more sure."

December 29—The State Department says that Secretary of State Dulles plans to attend the meeting of the foreign ministers of Baghdad Pact countries in Ankara late in January.

Government

December 2—President Eisenhower attends an hour and forty minute Cabinet meeting a week after his mild stroke.

December 5—The President appoints W. Wilson White as new Assistant Attorney General for civil rights.

December 10—The Atomic Energy Commission lowers permissible levels of radiation exposure for atomic workers and populations outside atomic facilities by two-thirds.

Six physicians examine President Eisenhower and say he can go to the NATO meeting in Paris. They term his recovery "excellent."

December 13—The President appoints Karl L. Rankin, Ambassador to Nationalist China, as new Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

December 17—The President appoints former Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Sumner G. Whittier as Veterans Administrator.

December 18—James Spence Galloway, a Senate committee witness, testifies that he paid \$1,000 to Judge Raulston of Chattanooga, to "fix" a stolen property case.

December 23—President Eisenhower "unfreezes" \$177,000,000 in housing funds as a move to counteract recession.

December 24 — The President nominates Charles W. Yost as Ambassador to Syria, replacing James S. Moose, Jr.

The White House makes public the resignation of James P. Richards as special envoy to the Middle East.

December 30 — The Administration announces a billion dollar, four year program for American education, geared to the necessities of "long term national security."

Labor

December 5—Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell tells the A.F.L.-C.I.O. that the President's program for labor includes recommendations to Congress requiring that all union officers be elected by secret ballot, that it be made a felony for employers to bribe union officials or for unionists to bribe employer's representatives, that union financial operations be disclosed.

December 6—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. expels the Teamsters' Union.

December 9—The independent Motormen's Benevolent Association votes to strike on New York subways. 4.7 million riders are inconvenienced by the stoppage.

The A.F.L.-C.I.O. votes to expel the Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union not later than March 15 unless corrupt leadership is purged.

December 14—The Washington State Superior Court finds Dave Beck, former Teamsters president, guilty of stealing \$1,900.

December 16—The Bakery and Confectionery Union suspends five officers for dual unionism.

The New York city subway strike ends.

December 18—The Interstate Commerce Commission rules that trucking lines cannot legally sign contracts with the Teamsters that include a ban on "hot cargoes."

Military Policy

December 3 — Administration spokesmen brief Congressional leaders on defense plans in a five-hour session.

December 4—General Edwin B. Broadhurst is named Chief of Staff of the Strategic Air Command.

The Air Force reveals plans for four

launching sites for Bomarc long-range anti-aircraft missiles, at Bangor, Maine, Falmouth, Massachusetts, Westhampton Beach, L.I., and Wrightstown, New Jersey.

December 6—The rocket Vanguard carrying the first U.S. test satellite catches fire two seconds after it is fired at Cape Canaveral.

December 17—The Defense Department reveals that the ICBM Atlas was fired successfully for the first time. Secretary of the Air Force James H. Douglas says the missile will be ready for combat use within two years.

December 18—An Army Jupiter is successfully launched at Cape Canaveral.

December 20—Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy says that the Administration will ask Congress for an extra billion dollars for missiles and other weapons development.

Some of the recommendations of the top-secret Gaither Committee report are reported from Washington: the committee urges the U.S. to undertake a sustained build up of offensive and defensive power; and to undertake shelter construction on a nation-wide scale, at a cost of some \$22 billion.

December 23—The Skate, third nuclear-powered submarine, is commissioned at Groton, Conn.

December 26—The Atomic Energy Commission sets up a separate office for regulation of the atomic energy industry.

December 28—White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty denies that the unpublished Gaither report found the U.S. weak in relation to Soviet Russia. The report, he says, is still "classified."

December 30—The Boeing Airplane Company rolls the first Bomarc 2000 mile-an-hour supersonic interceptor missile off its assembly line.

Politics

December 5—Charles S. Thomas, Republican National Chairman, says that the Republican goal for the 1958 congressional campaigns is \$3,650,000.

December 23—Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio says he will run for a third time for the Senate.

December 25—It is revealed in New York that the national executive committee of the Communist party has decided to stop publishing *The Daily Worker*.

December 28—Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri says he will run for a second Senate term in 1958.

Supreme Court

December 9—The Supreme Court rules unanimously that it is a violation of federal law for New York State law enforcement officers to resort to wiretapping.

December 16—The Supreme Court rules that when railroads sue the Government for unpaid freight charges they must prove that their bills are correct.

December 31—U. S. District Court Judge R. E. Thomason dismisses the Government's case against former union official Clinton E. Jencks.

VENEZUELA

December 15—Voting takes place on a plebiscite to decide whether to extend General Marco Perez Jimenez' presidential term for another 5 years.

December 16—According to official estimates, Jimenez is returned to office for 5 more years.

YUGOSLAVIA

December 4—Parliament approves a 5-Year Plan to increase production, consumption and investment.

December 6—U. S. Ambassador James W. Riddleberger talks with Marshal Tito on Brioni Island on Yugoslav-United States relations.

December 8—It is reported that Marshal Tito assured Ambassador Riddleberger that Yugoslavia intends to maintain its course independently of the Soviet Union.

December 9—Tito calls for an end of U.S. military aid to Yugoslavia; no new items have been ordered under the military aid program since 1956. Economic assistance is to continue.

December 27—Yugoslavia is to buy \$7,500,000 of U.S. wheat.

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